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Economically Benevolent Dictators:
Lessons for Developing Democracies
Ronald J. Gilson* & Curtis J. Milhaupt**
Abstract
The post-war experience of developing countries leads to two depressing
conclusions: only a small number of countries have successfully developed; and
development theory has not produced development. In this article we examine one
critical fact that might provide insights into the development conundrum: Some
autocratic regimes have fundamentally transformed their economies, despite serious
deficiencies along a range of other dimensions. Our aim is to understand how growth
came about in these regimes, and whether emerging democracies might learn something
important from these experiences.
Our thesis is that in these economically successful countries, the authoritarian
regime managed a critical juncture in the country’s development--entry into global
commerce by the transition from small-scale, relational exchange, to exchange where
performance is supported by government action, whether based on the potential for
formal third party enforcement or by the threat of informal government sanctions.
Compared to a weak democracy, a growth-favoring dictator may have an advantage in
overcoming political economy obstacles to credibly committing that rent seeking will not
dissipate private investment.
We explore this hypothesis by examining the successful development experiences
of three countries in the late twentieth century: Chile under Augusto Pinochet; South
Korea under Park Chung-Hee; and China under Deng Xiaoping and his successors.
Although the macroeconomic policies and institutional strategies of the three countries
differed significantly, each ruler found ways to credibly commit his regime to growth.
Decades of law reform activity by the World Bank, IMF, and other international
organizations, along with a vast academic literature, assume that an impartial judiciary
*
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is the key to the transition from relational to market exchange. Our study reveals that a
variety of alternatives are possible.
We then consider a now familiar question raised about contemporary China:
Does economic development inexorably lead to political liberalization? The
conventional wisdom says yes, drawing support from the experience of Chile and South
Korea. We show that the conventional wisdom overlooks important features of the
Chilean and Korean historical experiences that bear directly on China. The same
incentive structures that have propelled Chinese economic growth are likely to slow
political liberalization.

The post-war experience of developing countries leads to two depressing
conclusions. First, only a relatively small number of countries have successfully
developed. The second depressing conclusion follows directly from the first.
Development theory, in all of its evolving iterations, does not seem to work in the most
fundamental way: it has not resulted in development.1
In this article, we respond to this discouraging result by approaching the problem
from a different direction. We will work backwards from the facts to see if a pattern
emerges that might provide insights into the development puzzle. We recognize that this
methodology runs the serious risk of reducing to a tautology: what worked defines what
should work. To avoid this result, or to at least make our process transparent if we make
mistakes or succumb to the lure of a neat result, we will focus on one critical fact: to a
striking degree in recent decades, some autocratic regimes have managed, despite their
serious failings in other areas, to develop (indeed fundamentally transform) their
economies. Our thesis is that in these successful countries, an autocratic regime has

1

William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the
Tropics (2001). See Jessica Cohen & William Eastrerly, Introduction: Thinking Big versus Thinking
Small, in What Works in Development? Thinking Boig and Thinking Small 3 (J.Cohen & W. Easterly eds.
2009) (canvassing failures of prior academic and policy efforts.).
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managed a critical juncture in the country’s economic development – the economy’s
entry into global commerce by the transition from relational exchanges to exchange
where performance is supported by government action, whether based on the potential for
third-party enforcement or by the threat of informal sanctions imposed by the
government.2 We characterize these regimes as “economically benevolent” autocracies.
By this term we mean an autocratic regime whose leaders’ utility functions rank longterm growth in GDP more highly than growth in their Swiss bank accounts, and thus use
the power of the state to pursue national economic transformation. This designation is
not meant as a term of praise, but rather as a way of distinguishing authoritarian rulers
who place national development ahead of personal enrichment. Put in Paul Romer’s
terms, the dictator has a taste for “nonexcludable goods,” those that create wealth for
everyone, as opposed to “excludable goods,” those that benefit only the regime’s
leaders.3 In this respect, our approach differs strikingly from the existing literature,
which “assumes that all rulers are driven by private objectives… .”4
We recognize that saying something favorable about autocracy will (and should)
generate an initially visceral negative reaction. Those leaders of the regimes we will
describe as economically benevolent very often were not benevolent – indeed, in some
2

The importance of this transition has been widely recognized. See, e.g., Doulgass C. North, Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990); Avinash Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics:
Alternative Modes of Governance (2004); Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract
Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1517 (2006); Ronald J. Gilson,
Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 Stan. L.
Rev. 633 (2007).
3
See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. Pol. Econ. S71 (1990).
4
Avinash K. Dixit, Democracy, Autocracy and Bureaucracy, 1 J. Globalization & Democ. at 9 (2010). Of
course, the autocrat also may be maximizing non-pecuniary private benefits in pursuing growth, for
example, being known as the father of the country or reducing the threat to his position posed by poor
economic performance. For present purposes the key is not that the regime leaders get a psychic benefit
from pursuing economic development, but that they choose to pursue non-pecuniary as opposed to
pecuniary private benefits. As we will discuss, the preference for growth by the economically benevolent
autocrat is crucially supported by assurances that economic actors will be able to keep the fruits of their
investments. See infra text at notes 152-155.
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cases were monstrous – along other dimensions. Moreover, autocracies on average have
produced no better (and by some measures lower) economic growth than weak
democracies, 5 the only other horse in the race.6 But our thesis is that not all autocratic
regimes are the same; the performance of such regimes in, for example, Korea, Taiwan,
Chile, Singapore, and China, was dramatically better than average. In those countries,
perhaps through sheer luck, the regime leaders had different ambitions, and as a group
they did much better than both other autocracies and less repressive regimes.7
As we will elaborate later, however, we hardly mean to suggest that sensible
policy is to seek out economically benevolent dictators to staff the transition of
developing countries. Serendipity, not planning, explains the appearance of growthseeking autocratic regimes. Rather, our goal is to identify functionally what these
regimes did to effect the necessary transition, and to assess what other less repressive
institutions might substitute for dictators in accomplishing these tasks. To anticipate our
argument, emerging democracies cannot easily provide the credible commitment to
protect the returns of those who need to invest their financial and human capital for
growth to occur. The risk remains that future governments will descend into rent seeking

5

Studies include Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They are and How to Acquire
Them, 35 Stud. In Comp. Int’l Dev. , Issue 3 at 3 (2000); Christopher Clague, Phillip Keefer, Stephen
Knack & Mancur Olson, Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies, 1 J. Econ. Growth
243 (1996); Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes & Economic Growth, 7 J. Econ.
Persp. 51 (1993); Robert J. Barro, Democracy and Growth, 1 J. Econ. Growth 1 (1996); Aymo Brunetti,
Political Variables in Cross-Country Growth Analysis, 11 J. Econ. Surveys 163 (1997). The literature is
reviewed most recently in Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi & James Raymond Vreeland,
Democracy and Dictatorship Revisted, 143 Public Choice 67 (2010); Dixit, supra note 5.
6
Our colleague Charles Sabel reminds us that our list leaves out Western democracies like Finland and
Ireland that have successfully developed. Both these countries, however, were mature democracies. Our
focus here is on the more typical developing country, where the political choices are limited to dictators
and weak democracies.
7
Consistent with our view, Joseph Wright’s empirical assessment suggests that differences among
autocratic regimes accounts for much of the variance in results in comparisons of the economic growth of
autocratic and democratic regimes. Joseph Wright, Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How
Legislatures Affect Economic Growth, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 322 (2008)

4

and promote policies that devalue prior investments. Economically benevolent
autocracies can provide that commitment, at least for a period of time. Our aspiration is
to learn from the experience of economically successful autocratic regimes how to
fashion functionally equivalent strategies for emerging democracies. As initial examples
of this approach, we will examine the potential for regional commercial courts,
unorthodox investor protection mechanisms, and creative contracts to substitute for part
of the dictator’s function.
We also recognize that identifying and evaluating the role played by economically
benevolent autocracies will be to a significant extent context specific, which also will
make it difficult to generalize without a deep account of each successful regime’s
experience. We will not undertake that entire project here. Rather, our aim is to motivate
that larger project by showing that our theoretical account, supported by case studies of
several economically successful, but quite different autocratic regimes, is plausible. Our
case studies include South Korea under Park Chung-Hee, Chile under Augusto Pinochet,
and China under Deng Xiaoping and his successors.
We also hope to shed some light on the recent emphasis in development theory on
the central role of institutions. Suppose that the institutionalists have got it right – what
ultimately is needed for lasting growth are formal institutions that support arm’s length
capitalism.8 How then do we get those institutions? Nearly two decades of work by the
World Bank and other international financial organizations, supported by a considerable
amount of scholarship, suggests that effective formal legal institutions and an

8

William Easterly, Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (2008), nicely captures in
a handful of pages the debate over the role of formal institutions in supporting exchange and investment.
Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists
versus Skeptics, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 895 (2008), provides a more complete account.
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independent judiciary are indispensible attributes of successful development. Yet
precisely because each country’s history and capacities will be deeply path dependent,
and because building credible formal institutions is a time consuming task, we need a
stable of approaches to building the institutions necessary to success.9 The variety of
methods used even in different autocratic regimes may serve as a catalogue of options
that can be adapted to a particular country’s circumstances and accomplished by less
repressive methods. As Franklin Allen and Jun Qian’s work has stressed, for example,
the institutions China has used to support market-based exchange are very different from
Western institutions that accomplish the same result, even while Chinese institutions may
be moving toward more Western structures.10 At the very least, understanding the means
by which non-democratic regimes transformed their economies without high quality
formal legal systems should unsettle assumptions about the required character of
institutions for growth, and shift the inquiry to their essential functions.
Finally, we believe that our examination of the Chilean and South Korean
experiences under authoritarianism provides insights into the potential for political
liberalization in China. Many commentators casually cite these experiences in support of
a tight linkage between economic development and eventual political liberalization. Our
perspective, which focuses on the role of business elites under authoritarian regimes,
provides an alternative and generally less sanguine approach to the question of China’s
political future.

9

Dani Rodrik makes the same point with respect to the promulgation of best practice codes. “Best-practice
institutions are, almost by definition, noncontextual and do not take into account … complications. Insofar
as they narrow rather than expand the menu of institutional choices available to reformers, they serve the
cause [of development] badly.” Dani Rodrik, Second-Best Institutions, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 100, 104 (2008).
10
Franklin Allen & Jun Qian, Comparing Legal and Alternative Institutions in Finance and Commerce,
Working Paper (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.ssrn.com.
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Part I sets out the analytic framework: the capacity of a growth-favoring
autocracy to credibly commit to investors that the return on their investments will not be
dissipated by rent seeking. Part II then puts the problem of credible commitment in
context. Developing countries can experience quite dramatic initial growth through
relational contracts, without the need for formal contract enforcement or informal
government encouragement of contract performance by domestic parties. However,
breakthrough economic development, by entering the arena of global commerce, requires
moving beyond carefully nurtured relational contracting to more arms’ length trading.
As we will see, the difficulty is one of political economy: existing elites, whose position
depends on their success in a relationally based economy, may resist the changes that will
increase total output at the expense of their share. In this account, the critical role of
economically benevolent autocratic regimes is to impose – or perhaps more accurately
negotiate – the shift to a different set of complementary institutions. Part III then surveys
the experience of three quite different countries to highlight what economically
benevolent regimes have done to facilitate the transition. South Korea experienced a
military coup that explicitly sought an “industrial revolution,” influenced by the
experience of Meiji Japan. In Chile, democracy characterized by rampant rent seeking
was replaced by a military dictator, whose regime embraced a free market policy
informed by economists trained at the University of Chicago. Finally, in China the
Communist Party embraced a policy focused on economic growth, led in part by state
owned enterprises, with the state playing a role that curiously recalls that of the general
partner of a private equity fund. Part IV undertakes a comparative analysis of these three
quite different experiences of development under autocracy. Part V then addresses the
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lessons of our analysis for developing democracies, such as the potential for a regional
commercial court to provide participating countries with a commitment device they could
not create individually. Finally, Part VI concludes by considering the relevance of our
analysis to a vexing problem – the relationship between economic growth and
democracy, where the direction of causality has enormous policy implications.
I. The Analytic Framework
Our effort here is to explain the following pattern. As an empirical matter, it is a
close race on average between emerging democracies and autocratic regimes in terms of
which form of government is associated with higher growth rates in developing
countries.11 As a matter of theory, it is hard to predict a winner, since each form of
government is subject to a different but debilitating flaw. Autocratic governments are
prone to kleptocracy where the most significant export is of capital to private Swiss bank
accounts.12 Weak, or unconsolidated democracies are prone to interest group rent seeking
that expands the range and magnitude of poor economic policies whose purpose is to pay
off the interest groups rather than to support growth. These policies increase uncertainty
and correspondingly decrease the incentives for private investment.13 This concern over
the political economy of interest groups mirrors that raised many years ago with regard to
a particular still-weak democracy – the threat to U.S. development posed by factions that
Hamilton highlighted in the Federalist papers. As Tolstoy stresses with respect to
unhappy families in Anna Karenina, there is no single way to fail.14 The problem we
address here is that there seems to be no clear way to succeed.

11

See the sources in note 5 supra.
See note 4 supra (literature “assumes all rulers are driven by private objectives”).
13
Easterly, supra note 1.
14
Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 1 (Barnes & Noble Classics ed. 2003).
12
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The autocracies whose successful development we will canvass in Part III have
not followed a single development strategy. Indeed, the three case studies we offer here
were chosen for this reason. Chile followed an explicitly University of Chicagoinfluenced strategy that dictated a dramatic opening of its markets. Korea, in contrast,
created an export-oriented economy with government supported champions chosen from
among the existing elite and protection of domestic markets. China has followed a stateled, export oriented policy, with fairly open markets, but with the state playing a role
resembling the role played by another autocratic champion of transitions – the private
equity investor.
The problem, then, is to explain this odd pattern of examples: governments that
share a common structural characteristic, but with a diversity of strategies, all of which
have led to successful development. Counter intuitively, a central feature of our account
is that the choice of a particular development strategy is not the key to understanding
patterns of development. Rather, from our perspective, the starting point is the
preferences of the decision maker, whether lawmakers and bureaucrats in a democratic
government or a benevolent despot in an autocracy, and the decision maker’s capacity to
credibly commit to a growth strategy –almost any rational growth strategy – that seeks to
implement those preferences. Given the presence of these two elements, the choice of a
particular strategy is less significant. In the abstract, and given a credible commitment, a
number of strategies will work, with diversity resulting from each country’s choice of a
strategy that is complementary to its endowments and to the time it develops.15 Although

15

Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions
over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. Econ. Growth 131, 157-58 (2004), write:
“There is growing evidence that desirable institutional arrangements have a large element of context
specificity, arising from differences in historical trajectories, geography, political economy, or other initial
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different strategies may differ in comparative effectiveness depending on the state of the
world and the institutional endowment on which a particular country builds, that is also
true of developed economies. As Hall and Soskice show, liberal market economies
(think Anglo-Saxon) and coordinated market economies (think Germany and Japan) build
on different structures and can be expected to be more or less effective depending on the
time and the particular production technology.16 Put differently, economic growth
requires private investment – in industrial and human capital – that will be made only if
investors believe that supportive policies will be followed. Therefore, our prediction is
that growth depends in the first instance on a government that wants to grow the size of
the pie, rather than protect the size of the pie taken by a favored few. A small number of
autocracies have this preference, although most do not. Those that do represent the
serendipitous initial position of a path dependent process.
We note, however, that our ecumenist approach to growth strategy is not entirely
without limits. Joseph Stalin was in a sense an economically benevolent dictator.17 In a
period when successful development was seen as a function of growth in heavy industry
(although this was linked to the political goal of establishing a central role for the Soviet

conditions. … This could help explain why successful developing countries – China, South Korea, and
Taiwan among others – have almost always combined unorthodox elements with orthodox policies.” See
Dani Rodrik, Second-Best Institutions, supra note 9, (“Best practice institutions are, almost by definition
non-contextual.”); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do
Institutions Matter, 74 Wash U. L.Q. 327, 334 (1996) (“Each system solves the problem in the peculiar
context of its own path dependent institutions. In evolutionary theorist Stephen Jay Gould's terms, the
solutions are “jury-rigged from a limited set of available components.”); Gustav Ranis, Diversity of
Communities and Economic Development: An Overview, Dept. of Econ. Working Paper, Yale Univ. (Sept.
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475329 (Ethnically polarized societies more likely to engage
in rent seeking; initial conditions are important determinants of adverse development outcomes).
The standard reference for development strategy being contingent on when a country develops is
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (1962).
16
Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative
Advantage (2001).
17
The example dramatically illustrates that benevolence along the economic dimension leaves room for
monstrous inhumanity along others.
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Union on the international stage), Stalin succeeded in bringing about significant
economic growth. However, a planned economy strategy has proven to be a fatally
flawed basis for growth. The failure of command economies represents the limiting case
of our relative lack of concern among particular growth strategies.
An element in addition to the decision maker’s preferences, however, is
necessary, and it is this element that we argue can give the economically benevolent
autocracy an edge over emerging democracies in supporting growth. An autocrat’s
idiosyncratic preference for a growth-oriented regime rather than a kleptocracy must be
matched by a credible commitment to economic actors that their investments will be
respected and that they will be allowed to keep the gains from their initiative and efforts,
rather than see them dissipated by policy changes that favor politically influential interest
groups. Investors fear not just direct expropriation, but also a regulatory expropriation
through policy--for example, changes in import restrictions or exchange rate regulation18
that devalue their investment.19 This is not a simple institutional story; it is not enough,
for example, to set up formal institutions of the character championed by best practice
codes promulgated by the IMF, World Bank and other international financial
institutions.20 Russia, for example, adopted an ingenious corporate statute, devised and
drafted with the assistance of talented U.S. legal scholars deeply familiar with Russia’s

18

See Easterly, supra note 1, (reviewing examples of regulatory disincentives for investment).
See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (1995).
20
See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 Am.
J.Comp. L. 101 (2002); Dan Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois, Economic Development,
Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 Eur. Econ. Rev. 165 (2003).
19
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circumstances.21 The new corporate law failed because the institutions purportedly
created were not credible – they did not provide the protection promised by the statute.22
According to our hypothesis, it is the ability to credibly commit to sustaining the
institutions necessary to support business and human capital investment that explains the
success of economically benevolent autocracies. While the fact of their leaders’
preferences is idiosyncratic -- the serendipity of initial positions -- their capacity to
credibly commit is not. By contrast, emerging democracies have more difficulty creating
and sustaining credible institutions to assure entrepreneurs that rent seeking will not
compromise their ability to profit from their efforts. In the next section, we place the
problem of credible commitment to economic growth in context.
II. The Context: Transition to a Global Market
Breakthrough economic development requires that investors be protected from
two threats to their investment, one from the state and one from opportunism by trading
partners. As we have seen, the first category implicates the protection of investment
returns—a credible commitment by the state that it will neither directly expropriate
private investment nor indirectly expropriate the future earnings from current investment
through policy changes that favor powerful interest groups. The second category is the
realm of government assistance in protecting economic actors against opportunism by
their contracting parties,23 as we will see, a necessary condition for the country’s

21

Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harvard Law
Review 1911 (1996).
22
See Reinier H Kraakman, Bernard Black & Anna Tarassova. Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (2000)(explaining Russian failure).
23
Note that we frame the question as one of government encouragement of contractual performance rather
than simply the formal encouragement of contractual performance through the creation of a court system
and judicially imposed remedies for breach of contract. As discussed infra note 38 and accompanying text,
effective courts can be expected to take a lengthy period to develop. In the meantime, the government can
encourage performance by domestic contracting parties in less formal ways.
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expansion of its market by entry into global commerce, in turn a precondition for
growth.24 It is the second category – government assistance in the enforcement of
contracts – that will be our principal concern here.
A.

Reputation-Based Trading

Developing countries typically lack effective formal enforcement of contracts.
Douglass North identified self-enforcement as the core of commerce in such economies.
At its most simple, self-enforcement depends on the expectation of a lengthy series of
future transactions between the same parties;25 neither party will have an incentive to
cheat in a particular transaction because bad behavior by a party in one transaction will
be punished by the counterparty in a future transaction.26 But reciprocity-supported
exchange has significant limitations. Most importantly, the requirement of long-lasting
bilateral exchange to support self-enforcing exchange greatly limits the number of longterm trading partners available, and therefore, the size of the economy.27
Expanding the number of trading partners then requires adding the concept of
reputation. If trade will be multilateral rather than bilateral – that is, if one party will
trade with others in the future but not necessarily with any single counterparty repeatedly
– self-enforcing trade requires that traders develop a reputation. Such multilateral
exchange requires that a party’s behavior in one exchange must become known to
potential partners in future exchanges.28

24

As Romer puts it, “[W]hat is important for growth is integration not into an economy with a large
number of people but rather into one with a large amount of human capital… . [G]rowth seems to be
correlated with the degree of integration into worldwide markets… .” Romer, supra note 3, at 598.
25
See North, supra note 2.
26
See, e.g., Avinash Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance 16-17 (2004).
27
See Gilson, supra note 2, at 638-39.
28
Id.

13

Reputation based trading has inherent limitations. In order for the anticipation of
future trading parties’ actions to influence a trader’s current behavior there must be a
shared understanding of what constitutes breach of performance, and the trader’s current
behavior must be observable to potential future counterparties. Avinash Dixit
characterizes these limitations in terms of the distance between trading partners. The
greater the physical distance, the more costly it is for future trading parties to obtain
information about a party’s past performance, and to develop a shared understanding of
performance or breach, particularly if the new counterparties are also socially distant, in
terms of culture, language or class.29 Also, new or more complex transactions require
more costly information to support self-enforcement; understanding what constitutes
performance requires both more and different information, without the shared
information associated with more traditional markets. As Dixit puts it, the result is
straightforward: “cheating becomes more attractive the more distant the partner.”30
The scope and scale of a reputation market is thus self-limiting. At some point,
the gains from trading with more distant partners are outweighed by the costs necessary
to support reputational trading. The pattern of family owned conglomerates in
developing countries in part represents an effort to take advantage of scale and scope
advantages with respect to an existing reputation, but that strategy also comes with a cost:
less efficient production as a result of entering product markets with which the company
has no experience.31 And so the growth curve flattens out. While a reputation-based
29

“Cultural beliefs and behavioral norms coordinate expectations and provide a shared understanding of the
meaning of various actions.” Avner Greif, Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics
of Institutions Supporting Exchange, in Handbook of New Institutional Economics 727, 762 (Claude
Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds. 2005).
30
Avinash Dixit, supra note 26 , at 70.
31
Gilson, supra note 2, at 651-52. Conglomerates in developing countries also can serve to internalize
allocation of capital in countries where the capital market is inefficient. See, e.g., Tarun Khanna & Krishna
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commercial system can grow quickly, it ultimately runs into an upper bound.32 Thus, as
developing countries seek to integrate into global trading markets, reputational markets
ultimately must be supplemented by government assistance in assuring contractual
performance – as North frames it, “the development of the state as a coercive force able
to monitor property rights and enforce contracts effectively.”33 In North’s view, the
absence of effective penalties for opportunistic behavior by contracting parties limits the
scope of the market and is a central cause of the persistence of underdevelopment.
B. The Transition Problem
This brings us to the problem of transition: How do developing countries
accomplish the shift from reputational to state encouragement of performance of
commercial obligations? Here there are serious problems concerning both the state’s
will, and the availability of a method, to accomplish the transition.
1. The Olson Problem
The shift from relational enforcement of commercial obligations to third party
enforcement presents a cruel dilemma. The economic elite in a developing country likely
are those who are also the political elite – precisely the groups who have succeeded in the
existing relationally based system. They have the greatest system-specific investment in
reputation and the most to lose from changes in state policies that have been shaped to
favor them. They therefore have the most to lose from the reduction in entry barriers that
results from effective state encouragement of contractual performance. Following

Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets: An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business
Groups, 55 J. Fin. 867 (2000)( explaining the advantage of an internal capital market in emerging market
juridictions).
32
Avinash Dixit, supra note 26 at 82; John Shuhe Li, Relation-Based Versus Rule-Based Governance: An
Explanation of the East Asian Economic Miracle and Asian Crisis, 11 Rev. Int’l Econ. 651, 651 (2003).
33
North, supra note 2, at 59.
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Gilson, Hansmann and Pargendler,34 we call this the Olson problem, after the economist
who described the problem most effectively.35 Mancur Olson argued that these groups
would have both the incentives and the resources to make more difficult or to block the
development of formal institutions that devalue the incumbent elite’s investment and
position in the existing system.36
Rajan and Zingales address the Olson problem in the path dependent context that
we apply here, although they come at it from the opposite side. While we seek to explain
how particular countries overcame the barriers to transition to third party enforcement by
creating the necessary supportive institutions, Rajan and Zingales address the barriers that
lead to persistent underdevelopment by preventing the development of those institutions.
Following Olson (but without referring to him) in focusing on the underlying political
economy of transition, they conclude that “the persistence of underdevelopment is not
necessarily due to the existence of bad political, and consequently economic institutions.
Institutions may often be only the proximate cause. The deeper reason is the existence of
self-perpetuating constituencies. Changing explicit institutions without changing the
constituencies backing them is likely to be a futile exercise.”37
Developing countries thus face a significant political economy question in making
the transition from reputation-based enforcement to governmentally encouraged
34
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performance of commercial obligations. The necessary reforms will serve to increase the
size of the pie, but at the expense of shrinking the piece of the pie – both in economic
and, as a result, political power – of those whose cooperation is necessary to effect the
change.
2. The Non-Political Difficulties of the Transition
A developing country seeking to join the global economy by moving toward
third-party enforcement confronts more than problems of political economy. It also
confronts serious economic difficulties associated with making the transition. Two points
are critical to the analysis. The first is that government institutions providing formal
third-party enforcement take time to establish – credibility comes only after investors are
persuaded that they work. After a formally independent judiciary is established
economic actors must accumulate sufficient experience to believe that the courts work
quickly, reasonably accurately, and honestly. Intuitively, this period is likely measured in
generations, an intuition confirmed in a number of studies of judicial performance in
developing countries.38
What happens in the meantime makes things worse. During what may be a
lengthy transition period, economic growth can slow or turn negative as existing relationbased institutions become less efficient and their replacement by third-party enforcement
institutions remains incomplete. Dixit shows that a partial improvement in third-party
enforcement can undermine the performance of an existing system of relational
enforcement by actually reducing the consequences of cheating.39 Milgrom and Roberts
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argue persuasively that the deterioration in economic performance associated with
transition may be significant. A path dependent commercial system has important
complementarities between its segments. Each element of the system is chosen
sequentially so that it fits – that is, it not only adds its independent contribution to
performance, but increases the performance of already existing elements, a phenomenon
Milgrom and Roberts call “supermodularity.”40 The same characteristics that made the
economy grow so quickly during its early development then operate as a barrier to
transition: “Even if a coordinated adjustment on all relevant dimensions might yield an
improvement in performance, it may be that until all the features of the new pattern have
been implemented, the performance of the system may be much worse than in the
original position.”41 John Shue Li attributes the transformation of the “East Asian
miracle” into the “Asian [financial] crisis” to this pattern: “The dismantling of too many
exiting relation-based mechanisms in so short a period can damage the future potential of
economies at an early stage of development to continue to catch up; i.e., before reaching
the turning point where relation-based governance is still more cost-effective than rulebased governance ….”42
And now the political economy problem again rears its ugly head. A successful
transition requires sustaining a strategy – say reducing trade barriers – that in the short
run may make everyone worse off. This is a serious problem in an emerging democracy
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where many voters live on the edge and therefore one might expect that the endowment
effect – the tendency to overvalue losses compared to gains – would dissipate support for
the transition. The interaction of a transition-induced deterioration of performance with a
weak democracy produces, as Rajan and Zingales term it, the persistence of
underdevelopment. In the absence of the government having the capacity to credibly
commit to maintain policies that support growth, investors will not make the necessary
investments in businesses and human capital.43
C. Economically Benevolent Autocracies
We are now at the point when we can see the potential advantage offered by an
economically benevolent autocracy. The political economy problem mirrors a problem
that Acemoglu and Robinson identify in transitions to democracy.44 They posit a game
played between elites that have power and wealth, and non-elites who would benefit from
policies more favorable to them than to the elite. Non-elites will revolt unless they get
policies that improve their positions, although at the expense of the elites. The rational
equilibrium is a compromise, because a revolt destroys wealth and makes both sides
worse off by leaving less wealth to share. The problem is how to make a compromise
credible – what will keep the elites from reneging on their promises to share once the
non-elites stand down? For Acemoglu and Robinson, the answer is a shift from an
authoritarian government controlled by the elite, and whose representations of future
policy cannot be made credible, to a democracy, which makes commitments to future
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policy credible because some power over existing institutions is shifted to the nonelites.45
The transition to government encouragement of commercial performance that is
necessary to allow economic growth follows much the same logic, but with the direction
of the movement between democracy and autocracy reversed. The transition necessary to
sustain growth means taking something away from the elite, who are successful in the
existing relational economy. And while the new growth-oriented equilibrium will be
beneficial to the non-elites by opening entry to them, the transition problem of lowered
performance that can be expected to make non-elites worse off causes a shift of power to
the non-elites to fail because the non-elites will abandon the effort.46 Thus, the
commitment to growth-supporting institutions is not credible, and investment does not
occur. Consistent with the conclusion of Rajan and Zingales (although the logic differs),
emerging democracies have difficulty sustaining growth because there are no
constituencies that can be counted on to support the transition; the elites lose from the
transition, and the non-elites cannot see their way past the transitional downturn.
Here is where the economically benevolent autocracy comes in. Whether the
Park regime in Korea, the Pinochet regime in Chile, or the Chinese Communist Party, an
autocracy can, with the backing of the military, credibly commit to transition policies,
including especially the power to stay with the policies through the transition downturn.
One of those policies is government assistance in encouraging the performance of
commercial obligations.
45
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This brings us to our three case studies: economically benevolent regimes in
Korea, Chile and China. Our hypothesis is that the central feature of these three regimes
is their ability to credibly commit, not to a particular development strategy, but to a
strategy available to the particular country at that moment in time. Put differently, the
development strategy is path dependent, pulled together from the tools made available by
the country’s history and the time when development takes place.47 A second point is
also important. As we have argued, critical to a successful transition is the establishment
of credible government encouragement of commercial performance. In much of the
literature, the necessary mechanism for this transition is assumed to be Western style
courts. Although the World Bank has encouraged the formation of judicial systems in
developing countries, the failure of that undertaking has been repeatedly noted.48 Our
view is far more functional in character. An autocratic government can penalize
domestic parties informally for breaches of contract that interfere with arms’ length
contracting in the global market. For example, state support for designated business
groups can be withdrawn or reduced as a penalty for development-threatening behavior
without the need for formal courts, as was the case in Korea.49 Similarly, China has
provided increasingly credible commitments with respect to dispute resolution, although
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the institutions do not closely resemble those of Western courts.50 It is an open question
whether convergence of form will ultimately take place, an issue that will depend on the
evolution of the particular autocratic government. We will touch on this issue in closing,
but without the conceit of trying to resolve it here.

III. Development Under Autocracy: Three Country Narratives
We explore our hypothesis by examining three of the most remarkable
development stories of the late twentieth century: South Korea under Park Chung-Hee,
Chile under Augusto Pinochet, and China under Deng Xiaoping and his successors.
A. South Korea
South Korea is one of the great economic success stories of the twentieth century.
Although it seems impossible to imagine today, in 1970 it was debatable whether the
North Korean or South Korean economy had more potential. In 1965, per capital income
in the South was $100. Fuelled by an export-led growth strategy, however, the South
Korean economy boomed over the ensuing decades. Its export sector expanded from 4%
of GNP in 1964 to 40% in 1985. 51 In 1995, per capita income reached $10,000;52 by
2005, it had grown to $16,000. Today, while its communist counterpart to the North
languishes in abject poverty and experiences bouts of starvation, South Korea is the
world’s fourteenth largest economy.
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The key moment in Korea’s economic takeoff came during the presidency of Park
Chung-Hee, which lasted from 1961 until his assassination in 1979. While presiding
over an authoritarian regime “characterized by the brutal suppression of political
dissidents and labor activists, as well as the exclusion of the populace from politics,” Park
“played a central role in transforming South Korea from one of the poorest countries in
the world in the early 1960s into a developing country in the late 1970s.”53 As we will
explore below, Park accomplished his economic goals by mobilizing the only viable
economic resource in the country at the time, a nascent class of entrepreneurial talent, and
by forging a growth pact between their firms and his government.
To fully understand Korea’s high growth in the 1970s, it is helpful to review the
country’s early twentieth century history. Park’s policy choices were influenced by the
country’s, as well as his own, experience under Japanese colonial rule from 1910-1945.
The Japanese made heavy use of the Meiji economic model in Korea. Apropos of that
model, the relentless focus of the colonial state was development of the Korean economy.
Economic growth was elevated to a national mission, and development was orchestrated
by an effective bureaucracy that became extensively involved in economic planning and
management. As one economic historian puts it, the colonial state became “heavily and
directly involved in economic tasks, and judged strictly by economic criteria, performed
those tasks with ruthless effectiveness.”54 Again drawing on the Meiji model, however,
the colonial state also gave Japanese business groups, as well as an emerging class of
local landowners and entrepreneurs, a major role in the process of industrialization. To
this end, the state “employed a variety of carrots and sticks to incorporate the propertied
53
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groups in a production-oriented alliance.”55 Korean businesspeople lost considerable
autonomy under this alliance, but they profited handsomely from state-led
industrialization.56 Korea’s colonial legacy thus included a disciplined and effective
bureaucratic infrastructure pervasively involved in economic policies, and an
entrepreneurial class accustomed to working within a state-dominated alliance in pursuit
of export-oriented growth.57
The U.S. occupation of Korea after Japan’s defeat in World War II was followed
from 1948 to 1960 by a period of corrupt and ineffective rule under President Syngman
Rhee. A version of the public-private sector alliance that had developed in the colonial
period re-appeared under Rhee in highly corrupt form. In the aftermath of World War II,
a new group of businessmen emerged through acquisitions of state-owned enterprises and
other commercial activities. As they sought government support for expansion, a highly
clientelistic relationship between the economic bureaucracy and the business sector
developed. The Rhee regime, which relied heavily on U.S. foreign aid, proved incapable,
due to corruption and political weakness, of pursuing coherent development policies.58
When General Park Chung-Hee seized power in a military coup in 1961,
economic development became the overriding goal of the state. Several reasons for
Park’s emphasis on growth are plausible. First, the colonial experience provided an
institutional memory for the regime. Park had trained in a Japanese military academy in
Manchuria and was fascinated by the Meiji model. He was convinced that Korea should
55
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follow the Japanese path to modernity.59 One historian of the period argues that under
Park, South Korea “fell back into the groves of [its] colonial origins” because “the key
elements of the eventual path it adopted…--a Japanese-style, state-driven export
economy—were deeply etched into the social fabric.”60 Second, Park’s regime—the
product of a coup--lacked political legitimacy. The military justified its intervention into
politics by reference to economic development. Park himself explicitly stated the case in
1962: “[T]he key factor of the May 16 Military Revolution was to effect an industrial
revolution in Korea.”61 Although the United States was displeased with a military junta
in Korea, it was eager to see reform of Korea’s economic policies.62 Economic
development would serve as a stabilizing force on the peninsula and provide a bulwark
against the existential threat from North Korea. Thus, a governing strategy focused
almost exclusively on economic development simultaneously fit Park’s personal
conception of Korea’s national destiny, was central to his own political (and possibly by
extension, physical) survival, and advanced important strategic objectives of his
indispensible supporter, the United States.63
Yet more than an idiosyncratic preference for growth by the political leadership
was necessary to transform the country economically. Park also had to find (or create)
actors capable of carrying out his developmental agenda, while making credible his
regime’s commitment to growth. Particularly given the country’s poverty and climate of
corruption, how were these sizeable challenges accomplished?
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Park hitched his quest for an “industrial revolution” in Korea to the one resource
at his disposal--the entrepreneurs who had emerged under the previous regime. One of
Park’s first policy initiatives following the coup had in fact been to prosecute this class of
businessmen for corruption. But he pulled back upon the realization that “the only viable
economic force happened to be the target group of leading entrepreneurial talents with
their singular advantage of organization, personnel, facilities and capital resources.”64 A
central figure in the military junta put it simply: “It was essential to co-opt [the business
sector] in order to carry out revolutionary tasks.”65
Like its colonial forebears, the Park government created an implicit alliance with
the existing entrepreneurial elites in pursuit of economic development. The terms of the
alliance were straightforward: the government identified strategic industries and
corporations to be supported; favored firms expanded with government-directed loans
and developed key export-oriented industries under the protection of entry and exit
barriers provided by the state. For example, licensing requirements and trade protections
ensured market access to favored firms, while government-orchestrated mergers and
subsidized credit mitigated the ordinary market consequences of financial distress. In
return, the entrepreneurs worked closely with the government and abided by the policy
priorities of the regime. To carry out its industrial policy, Park’s government brought the
commercial banks under its control. It consolidated economic power in a handful of
ministries and staffed the economic bureaucracy with talented and zealous personnel.
The government provided low-cost credit to favored firms, and guaranteed loans from
foreign banks at a time when fledgling domestic enterprises were not attractive to foreign
64
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lenders and investors. To be sure, the strategy itself was not unique. In our view, what
distinguished the Park regime from similar efforts of other developing countries was the
regime’s success in committing to the enterprise.
The businessmen responded to these policies by developing large, diversified
conglomerates active across a range of strategic sectors. This pattern of interaction gave
birth to the modern-day chaebol corporate groups that continue to play a central role in
the Korean economy. Or as one commentator puts it, the chaebol “can be thought of as
the brainchild of the government.”66 Chaebol structures still reflect their origins in the
growth alliance with the Park regime. They feature a de facto holding company under the
direct control of the founding entrepreneur or his heirs, and an elaborate web of
subsidiaries—some with minority public investors, many without--bound together
through cross- and pyramidal shareholding structures and interlocking directorates.
These shareholding patterns magnify the voting rights of the founding family, allowing it
to retain control over the group despite massive growth and diversification of the
underlying businesses. Cross-subsidization of intra-group firms is common, and balance
sheets show high leverage, reflecting the traditional reliance on debt finance for
expansion.
As it developed, the state-chaebol relationship took on many characteristics of a
bi-lateral monopoly. Long-term, stable relationships among a small number of players
reduced uncertainty and increased incentives to cooperate. High switching costs made
alternative strategies unworkable. The state and the chaebol became locked in a mutually
interdependent relationship, for which continued growth was essential. The results of the
66
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bargain were dramatic: by the early 1980s, per capita income had reached $2000.
Korea’s five largest corporate groups employed almost a half million workers, and their
sales accounted for 50% of GNP.67 Park achieved Korea’s industrial revolution and
remained in power for nearly two decades until his assassination in 1979. For the
business leaders allied with Park, economic growth not only provided substantial
pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits, it also muted public criticism of the chaebol
groups’ accumulation of wealth and power.
The regime’s commitment to this implicit alliance for growth was secured in
several ways. One was the potential long-term nature and stability of the Park
government itself. Park was only 43 years old when he assumed power, and he ruled with
the support of the military and the intelligence service, the most powerful institutions in
Korean society at the time. In 1972, a new constitution effectively made Park president
for life, enhancing the political stability of his government. Moreover, in the early years
of his regime, Park’s policies were susceptible to influence from the United States, on
whom Korea relied for aid and military protection. The U.S. government was highly
supportive of devaluation of the Korean currency and other policies that would promote
export-led growth and economic stabilization. Parties dealing with the Park government
thus had reason to expect that the regime would be long lived and, most important, that it
would not veer dramatically from its emphasis on export-oriented economic
development. These factors may have been particularly salient given the strategic focus
on heavy industries such as chemicals and ship building, which require enormous initial
capital investments.
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Another crucial contributor to the credibility of the regime’s commitment to
economic growth was the relative “cleanliness” of the Park government, at least by
developing country standards. Park himself is remembered as a thrifty and uncorrupt
man.68 Although corruption certainly existed under his regime, it never reached
debilitating levels. In contrast to some other important examples such as Indonesia and
China, government and military leaders avoided involvement in business enterprise. The
private sector therefore did not face competition from firms affiliated with ruling elites,
increasing the value of market privileges bestowed on private firms. The business sector
was thus relatively secure in the expectation that as long as the economy grew,
cooperation with the government would be rewarded with a reliable stream of rents. In
turn, the central role of the military and intelligence service in the ruling structure assured
that non-cooperation would be punished.
The small number of hand-picked members of the alliance also enhanced the
credibility and efficacy of the arrangement. Small numbers permitted direct lines of
communication between the public and private sectors, and allowed the government to
closely monitor private sector performance and compliance with its policies. It also
ensured that the rents from industrial development would not be dissipated through
excessive competition among domestic producers. While the political and social
repressiveness of Park’s regime made obvious that the chaebol groups’ continued success
depended on maintaining their ”joint venture” with the Park regime, in turn, the chaebol
groups were protected to a significant degree by the law of small numbers: The scarcity
of alternative entrepreneurial resources in Korea at the time constrained the regime’s
ability to change champions. The elite’s economic interests were protected by the
68

See e.g., Moon, supra note 53.

29

commitment of the regime, supported by mutually high switching costs, rather than by
the rule of law.
To be sure, the Park regime was not averse to using the coercive power of the
state to obtain cooperation from the private sector. While the regime did face high
switching costs, the government’s control over resource allocation provided the means to
discipline large firms into pursuing its development objectives and limited opportunistic
behavior. All firms were required to join industrial associations formed under state
initiative as a means of gathering information and mobilizing support for government
policy.69 And although never strictly enforced, one of the Park government’s first acts—
the passage of a “Special Law for Dealing with Illicit Wealth Accumulation,” subjecting
businessmen to arrest and confiscation of their assets for engaging in corrupt activities
under the Rhee regime—immediately brought the business leaders into a more
subservient position vis-à-vis the state.70
Yet overall, Park’s regime pursued governance strategies plainly favorable to the
major firms. As in the colonial period, authoritarian rule provided a form of social order
conducive to economic growth.71 Organized labor in particular, but also other social
groups which posed a potential threat to industrialization, were relentlessly suppressed.
These policies naturally slowed the growth of legal rights and protections that could
potentially be used against favored economic actors. For example, the development of
shareholders’ rights was consciously restrained as a means of encouraging the chaebol
groups to diversify sources of funding. Equity finance would be more palatable to major
firms if the controlling shareholders did not have to worry about legal claims from
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minority public investors.72 Membership in the alliance with the government thus offered
protection from a variety of ordinary market risks attendant to any private firm’s
operations, such as minority shareholder complaints, insolvency, and labor strife.73 And
while a link between a ruling government and business elites is commonplace in
developing countries, what distinguished the Park regime was its commitment to
economic development, to the creation on “non-excludable” goods.
As can be seen from this sketch, Park’s bargain with the chaebol provided a rough
but effective substitute for a formal legal infrastructure to support market activities in the
transformative period of Korean growth. The bilateral monopoly locked in place by high
switching costs generated its own set of high-powered incentives and monitoring devices.
The legal system gained greater relevance only when the joint venture between the
regime and the chaebols came under pressure from changes in Korea’s domestic political
climate and international economic aspirations. Demand for law – that is, for restrictions
on the chaebol’s protected status -- most saliently investor and labor protections,
bankruptcy processes, and anti-trust regulation, and pressures for a more open political
process, grew after the underpinnings of the high-growth bargain had been severely
cracked in the 1990s. Korea’s formal legal system today is much more highly developed,
and the relationship between the government and the business sector is considerably more
arms-length, than under Park or his military successors. Yet important bilateral
monopoly qualities of the government-chaebol relationship remain to this day – the
bargaining position of the parties shifted within the relationship rather than switching

72

For an analysis of why minority shareholders in a country with weak investor protections may
nonetheless be willing to invest in public firms dominated by their founders, see Sang Yop Kang,
Understanding the Controlling Shareholder Regime, unpublished working paper (2010).
73
See Lee, supra note 70.

31

costs dissipating entirely. As we will explore in Part VI, integrating the chaebol growth
pact into a transparent legal system and democratically accountable government remains
one of Korea’s principal institutional challenges.
B. Chile
As Park’s industrial revolution was gaining momentum in Korea, on the other
side of the world another military government was embarking on a national economic
transformation by vastly different means. In Chile, Augusto Pinochet and the military
seized power in 1973 and pioneered radical free market reforms long before the
“Washington Consensus” arose. In the 1990s, as Chile transitioned to democracy
following the end of the Pinochet regime, the country achieved annual growth rates of 7
percent with the institutional foundation the regime created. But this is not the story of a
carefully controlled experiment by Milton Friedman’s disciples in the Southern
Hemisphere leading to rapid growth and eventual democratization, as the capsule version
of the “Miracle of Chile” portrays it. The reality is both more complex and more
illuminating.
Again, a short history is helpful before focusing on the authoritarian regime’s
approach to development. From the Great Depression until the coup that brought
Pinochet to power, Chile pursued a path of extensive government regulation and
intervention in the economy. During the first half of the 1930s, Chile suffered an
extremely severe output contraction, possibly the largest in the world in relation to GDP.
The worldwide depression and collapse of free trade led Chile to pursue an import
substitution strategy featuring the creation of numerous state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
protective trade barriers, price regulation, and expansion of the welfare system. Despite
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efforts to diversify the export base, in the 1960s copper continued to represent more than
70 per cent of total exports.74 These policies reached their apex with the elected socialist
government of Salvador Allende, who sought to further expand the state’s already
significant control over the factors of production and distribution of goods and services in
the economy.
The creation of state owned enterprises (“SOEs”) was intended to encourage
industrialization and alleviate Chile’s economic vulnerability by diversifying its heavy
reliance on copper exports. A state holding corporation (CORFO) was established in
1939 to promote industrialization directly (by creating new public enterprises) and
indirectly (by financing private sector enterprises operating in high priority industries).
By 1970, even before the Allende government came to power, most of Chile’s largest
firms were SOEs. The “entrepreneurial state” represented 21% of total investment,
almost 5% of national employment, and 22.5% of demand.75
The development of national industry was fostered through extensive trade
protections and controls. Price, wage and interest rate controls, set by administrative
decree, were pervasive. A wide array of interest groups found protection from
competition through the political process: virtually every profession and commercial
activity was secured by high entry barriers or extensive regulatory requirements,
reflecting the pervasive rent seeking in weak democracies highlighted by Easterly.76 In
the post-Great Depression twentieth century, the Chilean state became entrepreneur,
planner, regulator and protector; the Allende government represented an acceleration of,
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rather than a break with, prior patterns. By the time the military came to power in 1973,
Chile was one of the most closed and heavily regulated economies in the world.
At the same time, successions of Chilean governments faced pressure to alleviate
poor living conditions and inequalities affecting large segments of the population.
Expenditures on education, housing, health care and pensions steadily increased. Public
benefits were typically funded through expansionary monetary policies. By 1970, social
programs accounted for 42.5% of government spending, equivalent to 10.5% of GDP.77
As a result of these policies, Chile faced serious macroeconomic problems. Chronic
inflation was the most severe. Ballooning government budgets and easy monetary policy
led to annual inflation rates averaging 30% in the period 1940-1970.
These macroeconomic imbalances exacerbated social tensions and inequalities.
Distortions brought about through the complex and protectionist regulatory scheme only
worsened these problems. The Allende government responded by amplifying the policies
that had been pursued to that point. Trade protectionism and price controls reached their
peaks, land and corporate assets were expropriated on a large scale, and Chile became
more isolated from international trade than ever. Violent confrontations ensued as social
stability deteriorated along with the economic situation.
In the face of this turmoil, the military ousted Allende in a bloody coup in
September 1973. The coup marked a dramatic departure, not only from Chile’s history of
democratic rule in the twentieth century, but also from prevailing economic policies and
political economy interactions:
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[The military regime] pursued a “foundational” transformation of
Chilean politics and society, and a consequent radical transformation of
Chile’s economy. In the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s major
structural reforms oriented towards having a more open, competitive,
private-sector driven and price-deregulated market economy were
implemented. These reforms included privatization of state-owned
enterprises, dismantling the protectionist state, regulatory framework
changes to make it consistent with a more open and competitive society,
trade liberalization, tax, financial and social security system reforms and
overall market liberalization.78
The implementation of free market reforms under the Pinochet regime is often
described as a carefully planned experiment conducted by Chicago-school economists
who used Chile as their laboratory.79 From that starting point, explanations of the
Chilean experience tend to diverge in two directions: Some commentators draw a
straight narrative line between the embrace of free market reforms, Chile’s economic
“miracle,” and its eventual (re-)democratization.80 Others, focusing on the considerable
human cost of the Pinochet’s regime’s policies or the continued involvement of the state
in some industries even after the military coup, portray Chile’s economic success as a
“myth.”81 But both accounts neglect the fact that the Pinochet regime’s embrace of the
market – as opposed to the protectionist strategy of the past or of the Park regime in
Korea -- was not foreordained, and neither of the alternative perspectives on Chile’s
reform trajectory accurately captures the complex reality of the country’s experience
under Pinochet and beyond.
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Pinochet and the other military leaders who seized power in September 1973
began without a coherent plan to govern the country. They acted to remove what they
considered to be the serious threat to national order posed by the Allende regime, not to
replace it with a superior governance philosophy.82 The military had no experience in
politics or economic management. In fact, the interruption of democratically elected
government from 1973 to 1989 was a major exception to political tradition in Chile. For
several decades prior to the coup, the political establishment had marginalized the armed
force’s political role.
A lack of consensus on economic policy marked the first eighteen months of
Pinochet’s regime. While Allende was in office, a free market economic plan (known as
“El Ladrillo, or “The Brick” for its voluminous size) had been developed semiclandestinely by a group of naval officers and Chicago-school economists, who came to
be known as the Chicago Boys.83 These market-oriented intellectual voices drew
important support and amplification from El Mercurio, a conservative newspaper. The
Brick was prepared as an alternative economic plan for a post-Allende government, and
was actually presented to the military on the day of the coup. But the plan was not
decisive in shaping the Pinochet regime’s early economic policy. Military officers, not
economists, took the key economic positions at the outset of the regime. Most of the
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military were comfortable with the tradition of strong state intervention in the economy
that had characterized prior governments. Indeed, the free market plan was actively
opposed by a high-level committee of military officials formed to provide economic
advice to Pinochet. Even some important private sector groups who supported the new
military government were opposed, reflecting their attachment to the country’s
corporatist tradition and their own rents. Thus, the Brick was not initially greeted by the
new Pinochet government with anything resembling evangelical zeal, let alone
implemented in systematic fashion.
The government did not embark wholeheartedly on a free market economic plan
until April of 1975. At that time, the country was in the midst of yet another serious
recession. Milton Friedman made his famous visit to Chile to meet with Pinochet as his
top advisors debated whether to use a gradual strategy or shock therapy to restore the
economy. Pinochet was taken with Friedman’s advice to pursue massive economic
reforms at once. This decision had two major consequences: Pinochet took complete
control over economic policy, and the Chicago Boys became his closest advisors.
Unlike the other senior military leaders, Pinochet was keenly attracted to the
Chicago Boys and their ideas. There were several reasons for this affinity. First,
Pinochet disliked the prevailing social climate in Chile in which power and status were
perpetuated by family names and connections. Pinochet distrusted both business people
and politicians, and the Chicago Boys were outsiders to both the traditional business
circles and the political establishment. Second and relatedly, he was concerned about
opposition from labor unions, trade associations and established business leaders. Free
market reforms appeared to be a useful device for weakening the power of these groups
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by facilitating market entry by new domestic firms and foreign investors. In short, the
pre-Pinochet regime’s economic reforms had a political economy as well as an economic
reform dimension.

Market-oriented reform provided a response to the Olson problem.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, Pinochet’s ambition was to reshape Chile’s
institutions and economy. He wanted his name to be linked to the transformation of the
country, and he applied the strategic thinking of a military man to the accomplishment of
that goal. The Chicago Boys neatly fit his strategy. They were a zealous team of
technocrats with a logical and fully worked out plan of action. They had a strong sense
of mission, but were not ambitious in conventional political terms; at least at the outset
they, like Pinochet, were not rent seekers.
The ensuing process of economic reform can be divided into three distinct
periods. In the first period of structural reform, lasting from 1973 to 1982, the basic
foundation for a free market economy was laid. Price and wage controls were ended,
SOEs were sold to private investors, financial markets were liberalized, the tax system
was reformed, the foreign investment regime was restructured, trade protections were
eliminated, and the social security system was privatized. In the second period, from
1982-1984, Chile experienced a severe recession and social unrest touched off by a
financial crisis. The government intervened extensively in the financial system and
reversed some of the prior reforms. Interest rate and exchange controls were reintroduced and fiscal spending increased. As the country recovered from the recession, a
new wave of reforms was undertaken from 1985-1989. In this third period of reform, the
government measures taken in response to the crisis were rolled back while free market
reforms were extended into previously untouched areas. Most remaining SOEs were
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privatized. The central bank gained formal independence. Taxes and customs duties
were reduced.
As important as Pinochet’s policies themselves was the process by which they
were formulated and implemented.84 Economic reforms were undertaken through a
streamlined governmental structure, in which Pinochet, as the president of the junta, and
later as president of the country, exercised the executive power, while the junta
(consisting of the commanders of the military branches as well as the police) was vested
with the legislative power. A coordinator with the rank of minister and access to the
president received reform proposals, accepted or rejected them, and determined when to
forward them to the “legislature.” Every year the ministries prepared a list of the main
reforms they wished to have approved, and each minister was evaluated in large part on
how effectively he had implemented the reforms. Technical analysis and evaluation of
each reform was conducted by a planning office known as ODEPLAN. This office,
staffed with Chicago Boy technocrats, effectively replaced the pre-existing economic
bureaucracy.
This structure had enormous consequences. The political transaction costs of
policy making were greatly reduced by the small number of actors. Policy
implementation was facilitated by the concentration of authority in the president, which
sidelined other governmental actors. Most importantly, this process insulated the policymaking organs from interest group pressure. Reforms were undertaken based on
technical evaluation, without input from most social groups that would be affected by the
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new policies. Pinochet became an autocrat in economic as well as political terms.85 The
parallel to the Korea experience is striking. Despite radically different economic
strategies, the political economy of the two regimes shared the feature of a shift in prior
governments characterized by rent seeking alliances to governments committed to
economic growth.
There was one exception to this closed process of economic policymaking. Under
Pinochet, a new generation of entrepreneurs who shared the intellectual vision of the
Chicago Boys emerged.86 They understood the features of a free market economy and
were confident of the opportunities available through radical market liberalization.
Known as “the Piranhas,” these entrepreneurs founded conglomerates active in finance,
insurance and media. Unlike other private sector actors, they enjoyed access to the
Chicago Boys engaged in economic policy making. Their privileged access to
information and shared philosophical moorings with Pinochet’s economists made them
aggressive and highly successful investors in the first period of reforms. Their rapid
expansion served as an important locomotive for Chile’s growth in the first phase of
economic reform. Here too there was a parallel to Korea’s experience. Business groups
favored by the regime were an important engine of growth.
This pattern of interaction between the public and private sector changed as a
result of the economic crisis afflicting Chile from 1982-84, which threatened the stability
of the Pinochet regime. The situation re-ignited political opposition, leading to mass
demonstrations and the resurgence of political parties and labor union activism. To stem
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the crisis, the government intervened extensively in the financial sector. Ten banks
accounting for 45% of the capital and reserves of the entire financial system were placed
under direct government supervision or in receivership.87 The Piranhas were criminally
prosecuted and jailed. Pinochet removed the Chicago Boys from key positions in the
government and replaced them with people more closely aligned with traditional business
circles. The new players with access to the president shared the basic free market ideas
of those they replaced, but they accepted a more active role for the government in the
economy, and opened the policy making process to a wider spectrum of interests.
The change in personnel and policy making style, designed to neutralize threats to
the regime by co-opting its opponents, led to a partial reversal of certain initial reforms,
as noted above. But the move was strategic: once the economy recovered and political
threats subsided, Pinochet returned to free market policies with renewed enthusiasm. The
episode illustrates a consistent theme in economic policymaking under Pinochet:
“reforms were carried out in bursts, whenever political opportunities arose.”88
In summary, Pinochet eventually embraced free market reforms with a vengeance.
But the choice was the result of a complex amalgam of considerations, having as much to
do with strategic political calculation and personal ambition as with devotion to a
particular economic philosophy. To a certain extent, free market reforms were chosen by
default: laissez-faire was the only major approach to the economy that had not been tried
with abysmal results in Chile’s recent past.
But this raises our key question: Why did economic actors trust Pinochet’s
commitment to the new rules of the game? The centralization of political power in
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Pinochet and his junta might have led to doubts about the longevity of the new economic
policies: does one invest if future returns depend on the choices made by a small group of
decision makers? As just noted, Pinochet demonstrated a high degree of opportunism in
his approach to economy policy. Little stood in the way of policy reversals if political
considerations required them.
To a much greater extent than in the case of the Park regime in Korea or China
under Deng Xiaoping, the credibility of Pinochet’s economic policies seems bound up in
the prospects for political reform in Chile. In contrast to Korea and China, the
authoritarian regime that spearheaded the economic transformation was an aberration in
Chile’s political history. Throughout the twentieth century, Chile had been governed by
a constitution featuring separation of powers and regular elections among competing
political parties dominated by rent-seeking elites. With the benefit of hindsight, we know
that the authoritarian regime eventually gave way, beginning in 1989, to democratically
elected governments that continued Pinochet’s basic economic policies and institutions.
The economy prospered, particularly in the “golden decade” from the late 1980s to late
1990s—precisely the moment of Chile’s return to democracy. What is the link between
this political transition and Chile’s economic transformation?
The question is how current investors were assured that their future return would
be protected. How this was accomplished is not immediately obvious. One might
assume that the prospect of an eventual return to democracy in Chile following
Pinochet’s free market-oriented structural reforms would bring about a greater sense of
certainty to private actors than would be the case in a country without a democratic
tradition. Yet in the context of Chile’s historical experience, the specter of a return to
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democracy may have increased uncertainty among economic actors, perhaps to an even
greater extent than if the country had no democratic tradition. We have noted that Chile’s
pre-Pinochet political system was used as an extremely effective mechanism of rent
seeking by groups that gained influence in the democratic process. The democratically
elected Allende regime had attempted its own radical transformation of this economically
disastrous tradition, including large-scale expropriation of private property and massive
state intervention in the economy.89 Many of the political leaders with the potential to be
elected president in a post-Pinochet regime were staunch critics of free market policies.
Economic growth depended on a future political economy, as opposed to an economic
strategy, dramatically different from the dynamics of Chile’s pre-Pinochet democracy.
Given these uncertainties, constitutional reforms undertaken by Pinochet appear
to have been crucial in securing economic expectations during his regime, and beyond.
In 1980, a new Constitution was approved by plebiscite. It sought to lock in the free
market principles espoused by the regime, including property rights protections, freedom
of choice in economic affairs, trade and financial openness, and a subsidiary role for the
state in the economy. The Constitution’s drafters used a variety of powerful measures,
including the creation of a class of unelected senators, to make changing these economic
principles extremely difficult.90
Political features of the new Constitution also probably contributed to the
credibility of economic policy by bolstering the longevity of the regime while
simultaneously limiting the range of substantive policy allowable to the Pinochet
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regime’s successors. The Constitution fixed Pinochet’s presidential term at eight years,
and specified that at the end of that term the junta would nominate a candidate for a new
six-year term, to be approved by plebiscite. If, as actually happened, the junta’s nominee
(obviously, Pinochet himself) was not approved, then open elections were required one
year later. This structure meant that in 1980 when the Constitution was approved,
Pinochet was guaranteed to remain in office for at least nine more years.91 The
combination of economic and political provisions in the Constitution was thus highly
complementary—not because economic freedom was inextricably linked with political
openness, but because growth-favoring economic principles were cemented in place and
effectively de-coupled from political uncertainties, even in view of an eventual return to
democracy. The result was a credible commitment to economic policies supporting
growth that protected current investment against future policy changes.
The effectiveness of this constitutional design is confirmed by recent history.
Although the political features of the Constitution were amended by the democratically
elected governments that followed Pinochet, the economic provisions remain untouched
to this day. Indeed, the first two post-Pinochet presidents, center-left Patricio Aylwin and
Eduardo Frei, publicly declared that they would not alter the basic features of the existing
economic model. As scholars of the Chilean experience argue, “[t]he endorsement of the
development model by the first two democratically elected governments that followed the
Pinochet regime increased the credibility of the reforms, and in this way reduced the risk
of policy reversals. As a result, a quantum jump in investment and savings emerged.” 92
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Foreign investment trends appear to support this line of analysis. One of
Pinochet’s first economic reforms was to aggressively open the country to international
trade and capital flows. The restrictive Andean Pact framework was abandoned in favor
of one anchored in non-discrimination and limitations on discretionary authority of state
actors. A new foreign investment law was enacted in 1974. This statute (still in force)
provides strong investor protections, particularly in relation to remittance of profits and
safeguards against additional taxation. The law also establishes an administrative
procedure for challenges to governmental decisions that violate the principle of nondiscrimination, and permits foreign investors to challenge alleged violations by the
government before a neutral tribunal in proceedings outside Chile. Rates of foreign
investment increased immediately after the new statutory regime was put in place.93
However, the truly significant jumps in foreign as well as domestic investment took place
after democratic governments replaced the military junta in the early 1990s. For
example, the investment rate in capital assets as a percentage of GDP increased from
20.8% in 1989 to 30.6% in 1995.
In the final analysis, both the transformation of the institutional framework and
improvement in the political environment were crucial to the country’s economic success
in the 1990s. Chile’s rapid growth in this decade is thus explained by a combination of
favorable economic policies initiated by the Pinochet regime beginning in the mid-1970s
and improvements in the political environment beginning in the late 1980s that supported
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commitment to those policies.94 Put differently, the economic reforms were a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for the Chilean Miracle.95 While Pinochet’s reforms laid the
foundation for Chile’s transformation from a perennial economic basket case to a high
performer, an overall institutional transformation, including a return to democratic
governance, constrained in its ability to undermine economic reform, and provided the
credibility essential to Chile’s developmental success.
C. China
China obviously requires discussion in a work grappling with economic success
under authoritarian regimes. The economy has grown at rates of 7-10 percent per year
for the past three decades, raising millions out of poverty.96 It led the world in growth
rates of both GDP and per capita GDP over the period 1990-2007 and nicely weathered
the recession beginning in 2008 that affected most of the world much more
significantly.97 China’s growth has been largely investment-driven, with investment
consuming about 40 percent of GDP.98 Huge advances in productivity were achieved
once strict central planning was abandoned in the late 1970s. Opening to foreign trade
and investment, culminating with China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, also provided an
important engine of growth. By the early 1990s, China had become the second largest
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recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) in the world (after the U.S.), and it has
been the world’s top destination for FDI since 2003.
Not only is China’s growth the most spectacular of that under any authoritarian
political regime, but it poses the most serious puzzles for development theorists. As a
team of scholars recently noted, “[T]he experience of the reform era in China seems to
refute the proposition that a necessary condition for growth is that the legal system
provide secure property and contract rights.”99 China’s experience also seems to
confound the claim, which the Korean experience, among others, is often cited to
support, that economic growth inexorably leads to political liberalization.100
In broad overview, China’s growth can be divided into two quite distinct phases.
In the first phase, covering the 1980s, growth was sparked by agricultural reform, rural
entrepreneurship, and the transformation of local collectives into profit-oriented
enterprises.101 From the 1990s to the present, Chinese growth has been state led.
Reforms in the second phase focused on improving the performance of state-owned or
affiliated enterprises and the expansion of foreign direct investment. Laws were enacted
to provide an infrastructure for the transformation of SOEs into corporate entities with
outside investors, stock exchanges were developed in Shanghai and Shenzhen to create
an alternative to bank finance, and provincial leaders were incentivized to lure foreign
investment. At first, foreign capital to feed the investment boom was provided largely by
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ethnic Chinese investors, particular from Taiwan and Hong Kong. But by the mid-1990s,
FDI inflows increased and diversified significantly.
Although each growth experience is unique—and certainly China’s political
system creates important differences from our two previous studies—a theoretical
perspective focused on the problem of a government making credible commitments to
economic reform and encouraging commercial performance highlights some significant
similarities as well. We begin once again with the political commitment to growth--the
necessary but not sufficient condition for developmental success. As IMF analysts have
noted, “[i]n China, the political leadership imposed a vision for the path of growth and
development of the country.”102 Articulation of this vision began with Deng Xiaoping’s
ascension to power in 1978 after the death of Mao. Deng’s policies of economic opening
were reaffirmed during his tour of the southern coastal regions in 1992. In the wake of
the Tiananmen crackdown at the end of the 1980s, economic growth took on additional
political salience. An implicit social pact was sealed between the Communist Party
leadership and the Chinese public, under which freedom in the economic realm would be
granted in return for tight controls on political activities and a complete ban on challenges
to the one-party state. As in Park’s South Korea, economic growth became the central
legitimizing force of the regime.
As in our other country studies, however, the political leadership’s commitment to
growth cannot be the entire explanation for economic success.103 As noted above, in
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many respects China’s growth contract was even more incomplete than those of our other
case studies. In contrast to Korea, at the dawn of its economic takeoff China had neither
institutional memory nor an existing business elite to guide the economic path chosen by
the government; to the contrary, it had the social chaos and economically disastrous
polices of the Mao era. In contrast to Pinochet’s Chile, as a matter of government
ideology China remained ambivalent about the role of private property until long after
development had begun in earnest. And in contrast to both Korea and Chile, China
lacked even the rudiments of a legal system to support markets when Deng initiated his
policies. The Cultural Revolution had bulldozed the legal infrastructure—there were no
functional courts, no corporate or securities laws, no contract law to support private
exchange. Many of these standard elements of legal infrastructure for economic activity
were not enacted until the 1990s--well into the high growth era—and even then the laws
were primarily designed to spur state sector reform, not to support private sector
economic activity.104
Given this vacuum in formal institutions, how did the government manage the
economic transition to large-scale global market activity? Though the concrete
mechanisms varied over time, the Party embedded high-powered incentives for growth
within its own organizational structures. Economic growth became the key metric by
which performance was measured, and the gains from growth, while improving the lives
of millions, were disproportionately distributed within the party/state apparatus itself or
to close relatives and associates of senior Party members.
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overall function to a private equity firm, in which the managers of a highly leveraged
investment pool of operating entities have high-powered incentives to grow the
businesses in their portfolio, because they will keep a significant portion of the gains
from growth.105 And the Communist Party itself plays the role of the private equity
general partner, whose own interests provide a powerful incentive to monitor those
actually operating the business. The managers get rich if they do well, but are removed if
they do not.106 As one commentator puts it,
The CCP has not only been the instigator of economic growth; its
members have been the main beneficiaries of it….Above all, crony
communism in China is symbiotic: it is based on the mutual benefits of
both the party and government officials and the capitalists. Each side of
the relationship benefits from the interaction and lacks clear incentives to
change the rules of the game.107
And just as poor performance of the private equity general partner can be punished by
investors withdrawing their capital at the end of the partnership‘s ten year term, so the
Communist Party’s role is hostage to economic performance; poor performance would
threaten both the party leadership and, perhaps, the regime itself.
Because China’s growth period has two very different phases, our account is
divided into the early phase and the present phase. We focus in the early phase on the
incentives and informal property rights protections operating at the local level, where
growth first occurred. In the current phase, our focus shifts to informal practices to aid

105

Of course, high-powered incentives require complementary high powered monitoring mechanisms. See
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economic Organization and Management 221-28 (1992)(discussing
correlation between incentive intensity and monitoring intensity). We can understand the tainted milk
scandal in China as the result of mismatches between incentives and monitoring.
106
Ronald J. Gilson & Charles Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs and
Complete Capital Markets, 108 Col. L. Rev. 231 (2008), describes the incentive structure of the
participants in a private equity limited partnership.
107
Bruce J. Dickson, Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector 23-25
(2008).

50

quasi-privatization of state-owned enterprises, adaptive mechanisms for building
regulatory infrastructure, and protection of foreign investors.
In 1980 China introduced a new fiscal system under which provinces were
allowed to retain a large share of marginal increases in revenue, in effect giving local
governments a “carried interest” in economic growth. Local governments, which faced
serious budget constraints at the time, were motivated to expand sources of revenue by
developing the local economy and fostering the growth of local enterprises. A new form
of enterprise that developed under this fiscal system was the Township-Village enterprise
(TVE), which “played the catalytic role in transforming the Chinese economy from a
command economy to a market economy.”108 TVEs took different forms in different
localities. Some TVEs were owned and managed by local governments, serving as
subcontractors to SOEs. Others, the so-called “red hat” collectives, were essentially
private firms ostensibly registered as collectives to avoid political problems. Whatever
their form, the TVEs were critical to China’s early growth. In the 1980s, TVEs produced
10 million nonagricultural jobs in the countryside.109 By 1991, rural industry was
producing 50% of total industrial output, equal to that of the state-owned sector.
TVEs prospered in part due to ideological resistance to private enterprise, but
above all because of their fiscal importance to local governments. Rather than bleeding
local enterprises under their control, local government officials had incentives to grow
and take profits from TVEs to fund public services and subsidize less profitable sectors of
the local economy, such as agriculture. Local governments helped secure financing for
TVE formation and expansion by serving as guarantors, mobilizing funds through the use
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of personal and professional connections, and by permitting the formation of semi-private
credit institutions.
The importance of TVEs to local government revenues provided strong incentives
to secure their property rights even in the absence of formal protections provided by the
legal system. The incentives reduced the uncertainties facing private entrepreneurs by
making the local government’s commitment to growth credible. The local government
commitment supported by TVE revenues was complemented by the personal incentives
of local government officials. Local officials personally provided a form of protection of
expected investment returns and contract facilitation in the local economy, particularly in
regard to inter-jurisdictional business dealings. Private entrepreneurs from outside the
locale used government officials in the host jurisdiction to serve as their “agent for
contract enforcement.”110 For a fee (usually nonmonetary), the local official would
influence or pressure the local contracting party to perform his commitment to the
outsider. The initiative of officials to generate local economic activity took other forms
as well. For example, in some cases local governments relaxed centrally imposed
production quotas and devised formulas for sharing the gains achieved with local
producers.
Well beyond the TVEs, post-Mao China has made widespread use of privileges
awarded by the state to allow public bureaucracies to generate and keep revenue.111
Monopolies, sale of public services, and for-profit spin-offs of public enterprises such as
hospitals and schools are used to generate income throughout the bureaucratic hierarchy
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in China.112 One scholar argues that many of the rules governing the internal affairs of
the state and its lower level organs were designed precisely to promote administrative
self-financing. From this perspective, the involvement of Chinese bureaucrats in business
enterprise is not corruption, but implicit contracting – like that which is braided with
formal contracting in private equity structures113 – between the party-state and its agents
designed to reduce budget pressures, distribute rewards to the ruling elite, and retain
influence over an increasingly market oriented economy.114
The cadre evaluation system used by the Communist Party also contributed to a
more secure business environment for TVEs and other enterprises. This system sets
criteria for the performance—and hence the remuneration and promotion prospects—of
local party cadres and government officials. Under the system, the most heavily
weighted performance criteria relate to economic growth, tax revenue, and employment.
Officials cannot maximize performance along these metrics unless local businesses are
afforded considerable de facto protections of their investment returns.
In the second, state-led phase of China’s economic growth, additional dynamics
were at work in support of credible commitment to growth. We focus on two: the role of
family members of senior party leaders in the transformation of state owned enterprises,
and the expanded role of local-center relations, including jurisdictional competition and
experimentation, in the creation of an adaptive regulatory environment for economic
activities. These dynamics also contributed to the favorable foreign investment climate
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that developed in the second phase of growth, despite the absence of a robust legal
system.
As noted, the local, entrepreneurial emphasis of the 1980s gave way to a state-led
growth model in the 1990s. Virtually all of China’s most important firms, including its
publicly listed firms, are connected to national or provincial state organs. To this day,
most truly private firms in China are small, their business practices are opaque and
informal, and “few have graduated beyond the initial founding stage in the life cycle of
the firm. They are tightly controlled by the immediate family members of the founders
and are lacking in professional management.”115 This feature of China’s high growth sets
it apart quite starkly from the Chilean and Korean cases. In those countries, while the
growth effort was state coordinated, the governments relied overwhelmingly on private
enterprise—family based corporate groups--to carry out their economic policies. As we
will see, while the Chinese party-state has brought family members into its ranks, it has
done so in novel fashion--by sharing ownership in government controlled entities.
Relying on the family as the basis for business relationships has a long history in
China, as elsewhere when formal enforcement is not available.116 In China, family
oriented commercial activity has often operated outside the formal legal system. Franklin
Allen and Jun Qian argue that China has avoided western-style corporations financed by
dispersed investors because it “runs directly against the traditional Chinese model of
keeping business ‘within the family.’” 117 In the Qing Dynasty, local officials, families
and merchant guilds played a key role in commercial dispute resolution. Even after the
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emergence of Shanghai as an important international financial center at the turn of the
twentieth century, foreign merchants, lacking local knowledge and connections, did
business through Chinese middlemen and guarantors.118
Possibly echoing these historical practices, the Chinese Communist Party has
essentially installed a clan-based enterprise system at the top of the economic structure.
An implicit rule in China is that the children of high-ranking party officials hold positions
of authority in major enterprises. The actors in this process are the so-called
“Princelings” (taizi dang)—children of influential party members, whose nickname
derives from their quasi-hereditary privileges. 119 The term is also used more broadly to
refer to those closely connected to the Party establishment through marriage or collegial
relationships. The Princelings operate outside of established hierarchies, wielding
influence beyond and across the separate spheres of politics, business and the military.
The links between party officials and business managers are extensive, and
lucrative. In 2002, Newsweek reported on an internal Party survey indicating that 98
percent of senior officials had relatives in significant business or government positions.120
Another internal Party document indicates that 90 percent of the millionaires in China are
children of high-ranking officials.121 There are many examples of Princeling
involvement in nationally important businesses, including Zhu Yunlai, the son of former
Premier Zhu Rongji, the Chairman of China International Capital Corporation, China’s
first investment bank. Jiang Mianheng, son of former Premier Jiang Zemin, has
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extensive ties to the information technology sector. Rong Zhijian, son of former vicepresident Rong Yiren, is chairman of CITIC, the huge state-owned investment company.
Chen Yuan, the chairman of China Development Bank, is the son of Chen Yun, one of
the founding figures of the Peoples Republic of China. Close relatives of the current
leadership also hold high positions in business. President Hu Jintao’s son, Hu Haifeng,
until recently headed a state-controlled company called Nuctech, one of the world’s
leading suppliers of security inspection systems. Premier Wen Jiabao’s son is chairman
of New Horizon Capital, a domestic private equity fund, and his son-in-law appears on
Forbes’ 2005 list of The 400 Richest Chinese. The pattern is repeated at the local level,
where family members of provincial leaders often hold significant business positions in
business ventures and enterprises. And it extends to Chinese firms with foreign
operations. One study finds that “a remarkably high proportion of the managers of major
Chinese TNCs [transnational corporations] are relatives of senior government
officials.”122
The extensive linkages between Princelings and business has generated, in the
words of one commentator, a process of “elite privatization,” leading to “clan control of
China’s private enterprises.”123 The term elite privatization seems a particularly apt
characterization of China’s movement of assets out of exclusively state hands, and
presents a variation on the oligarchic form of privatization experienced in Russia about
the same time. Consider this description of the process:
The richest people in China are the relatives of the very top officials who
used their position to pass laws transforming state-owned industries into
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stockholding companies, and then appointed family members as
managers. In this way the children of top party officials--China's new
"princelings"--took over China's most strategic and profitable industries:
banking, transportation, power generation, natural resources, media and
weapons. Once in management positions, they got loans from
government-controlled banks, acquired foreign partners and listed their
companies on Hong Kong or New York stock exchanges to raise more
capital.124
The rise of Princeling-linked firms coincided with the central government’s policy
of developing national champions with internationally competitive capabilities and brand
recognition. The government thus had strong incentives to provide Princeling enterprises
with special access and protection at both the national and local levels. Moreover, these
benefits extend beyond the Princeling enterprises themselves, which sometimes act
essentially as general contractors, to a broad network of their subcontractors and
affiliates, which receive protection from the government in their role as suppliers to key
national firms. The process of elite privatization thus created firms that blur the line
between state and private enterprise—firms that enjoy unique advantages in navigating
the difficult terrain of the Chinese bureaucracy. While they are (understandably) a
frequent target of criticism by Chinese commentators,125 the Princelings thus appear to
have played a role in securing informal property rights and coordination of investment in
a rising China. The children of high party leaders, as beneficiaries of economic reform,
in effect act as Williamsonian hostages – the children of the monarch placed in the hands
of those who need to rely upon the monarch.126 And while children of the political elite
have played prominent and lucrative roles in states that failed to develop, the difference
in China is the Party’s commitment to growth; like the operating executives of the
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portfolio companies of a private equity fund, wealth for the Princelings depended on the
firms’ economic performance rather than the naked diversion of revenues.
Princelings have also played a role in providing a more secure regulatory and
political environment for FDI in China. Foreign investors may be attracted to Princeling
firms because of the special advantages and protections they enjoy. The government,
when considering action that might infringe the interests of foreign investors, must
consider the consequences for Princelings as well. For example, Morgan Stanley was an
initial investor in CICC, the investment bank headed by Zhu Yunlai, the son of the
former premier. Although Morgan Stanley was eventually eliminated from CICC’s core
management circle, its investment has never been jeopardized. Morgan Stanley’s links to
the Party establishment through Zhu provide it with a rough form of protection against
arbitrary or detrimental government action. Moreover, echoing practices from an earlier
era, Princelings also commonly serve as middlemen with respect to inbound foreign
investments. In such a role, they use their connections to senior party officials to advance
and protect the interests of foreign clients.127
We do not wish to overstate the role of the Princelings in China’s economic
success. China’s economy is vast and diverse, and this phenomenon is not an
explanatory silver bullet. Moreover, even the economic interests of the Princelings are
subject to infringement to meet higher political and economic imperatives of the Party. If
Princeling firms do not perform, they are punished. The point is that familial and other
close connections between political and business leaders in China have cemented a
developmental alliance that partially compensates for holes in legal infrastructure and
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participatory policy making processes, in effect discharging the functions of pre-existing
business elites in Korea and Chile during their economic transformations that China
lacked.
Apart from the Princeling phenomenon, the Communist Party has adroitly coopted private entrepreneurs into its membership ranks. After overcoming fierce
ideological resistance, in 2002 the Party began not only to tolerate party membership by
entrepreneurs, but to actively court them. Once again, an implicit bargain for growth is at
the heart of the strategy: “This integration of wealth and power is in the mutual interest of
both communist officials and private entrepreneurs. The officials rely on the private
sector to produce growth, jobs, and tax revenue, and the entrepreneurs rely on contacts
within the party to improve their business prospects.”128
A final, distinctive feature of China’s economic rise we highlight here is the
unusual adaptive capacity demonstrated by the country’s regulatory infrastructure. The
roots of China’s “adaptive authoritarianism” are complex and not yet fully understood,
but they seem traceable in significant measure to the related roles that jurisdictional
competition and experimentation have played in the formation of a market-supportive
regulatory environment.129
As the discussion to this point has indicated, post-reform China has developed
into a quasi-federal economic system. Strict central planning gave way to a system in
which control rights over economic inputs and allocation were decentralized and aligned
by means of incentives – in our terms, the ineffective efforts at complete contracting
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through central planning gave way to incomplete contracting where ultimate control is
buttressed by incentive alignment, a pattern that we have called a private equity model.
As we noted above, local and lower ranking officials throughout the bureaucratic
hierarchy were given substantial leeway in attracting and engaging in economic activity,
and allowed, formally through revenue sharing or informally through the ability to act as
middlemen, to share in economic success. As well, career advancement was tied to
measures of economic success. This system produced incentives to innovate in
regulatory and policy matters as well as economic activities. The central government,
ironically following Brandeis’ rendition of a central virtue of a federal system130 with
more intensity than its country of origin, uses local-level experimentation as a policy
laboratory. Successful pilot tests at the local level are generalized, coordinated, and
scaled up by central government authorities in a process that one commentator calls
“experimentation under hierarchy.”131 This process involves a “purposeful and
coordinated activity geared to producing novel policy options that are injected into
official policymaking and then replicated on a larger scale, or even formally incorporated
into national law.”132
Jurisdictional competition is an important feature of the process of local
experimentation. The special economic zones where China’s economic liberalization
began are one obvious example. Another is the development of the stock exchanges.
Although the exchanges are under the control of the central government and lack
significant formal enforcement authority of their own, they have experimented
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significantly with informal enforcement mechanisms such as shaming sanctions against
listed companies. Their regulatory strategies appear to be shaped by their competition
with each other, and Hong Kong, for listings.133
Returning to our private equity metaphor for the nature of China’s implicit
contract for development, the Chinese pattern of decentralized experimentation and
innovation bears close resemblance to key features of the venture capital model as
practiced in the United States. Venture capital finance responds to the problems of low
trust and high information asymmetry that would otherwise severely limit the growth of
start-up firms. Founders understand that meeting performance goals is necessary to
obtain future rounds of financing on favorable terms. Venture capitalists evaluate
innovation at an early stage and make predictions about the scalability of small-scale,
localized success stories, but without formal commitment to provide further funding to
the project.134 In the corporate venture capital model, established firms invest in start-ups
as a vehicle for experimenting outside organizational boundaries to promote trend
spotting, to recognize future capability needs and to acquire skills and technology.135
Established firms dispatch agents to observe and shape the experimental learning
processes in their local context (the start-up firm) with the intent of internalizing useful
insights. The Chinese process of “experimentation under hierarchy” mimics these key
features. Local learning and innovation take place under the patronage of senior officials.
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The staged replication and scaling applied in the Chinese context are similar to patterns
of finance in the venture capital industry, where projects are funded in stages and scaled
up only after they have proven successful at the experimental stage.
We began this overview of China by noting the challenge its growth poses for the
conventional wisdom that rule of law – formal judicially oriented contract enforcement –
is essential to economic development. One of us has argued elsewhere that China’s
“growth without law” can be exaggerated, in that law may have played important roles in
enhancing the credibility of government policy and signaling the trajectory of the
government’s reform policies to market actors.136 Whether or not law played a role in
China’s economic takeoff, it appears that important features of China’s institutional
apparatus today are becoming more regularized and law-oriented.137 Statutes and
regulations to govern economic activity have been enacted or revised at a feverish pace
over the past decade. Some government agencies, such as the CSRC, overseer of the
securities market and industry, have matured into sophisticated and well intentioned
regulators. Even some government organs that lack legal authority, such as the stock
exchanges, have creatively attempted to carve out for themselves a regulatory role
designed to improve corporate practices.138 Huge obstacles remain, of course. Effective
enforcement lags behind the enactment of legislation and regulations. The competence
and neutrality of the courts cannot be assumed. And political considerations remain
above the law. But a creeping legalism is under way. Allen and Qian persuasively argue
that non-formal techniques may suffice to trigger and sustain the initial stages of
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economic growth.139 They do not address, however, the extent to which non-formal
techniques will scale as China’s internal market grows to supplement the export driven
sector.
IV. Comparative Analysis
What lessons might be drawn from a side-by-side comparison of the three
countries’ growth experiences under authoritarian political rule? Our hypothesis is that
credible commitment to growth is the key contribution of an economically benevolent
autocracy—more important than other variables such as institutional formalism or
development strategy that are often the focus of attention. Consistent with this
hypothesis, our comparison reveals a high degree of variance in the mix of development
strategies used by the political leadership, as well as in the character of the institutions
used to carry out the growth-oriented policies, but a striking similarity in the function
performed by the institutions that emerged under the economically benevolent regimes
we surveyed.
The three countries in our study pursued radically different developmental
strategies. As we noted in our sketch above, the Pinochet regime ordered the
“Washington Consensus” menu of reforms long before it had been given a name. Chile
followed a standard free market approach to growth, featuring openness in trade and
investment, financial liberalization, and elimination of wage and price controls. By
contrast, South Korea pursued what has come to be thought of as the standard “Asian”
growth model, featuring a heavy export orientation, nurturing of strategic industries such
as ship building and chemicals, the pervasive use of directed credit, financial controls,
and protection of domestic industries. Although China has also relied heavily on exports
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as an engine of growth, it departed from the South Korean developmental path in two key
respects. First, in contrast to the Korean government’s reliance on private firms to carry
out its growth agenda, virtually all major Chinese firms are state owned or affiliated,
although even these state participants are highly incentivized.140 Second, the Chinese
economy is considerably more open to foreign investment and trade than has been the
case in other developing economies in Asia.141 The takeaway point from this aspect of
our comparison seems clear: national economic transformations are possible under a wide
range of developmental strategies.142
These substantial variations in developmental strategy are matched by large
differences in the character of institutions in the three countries. Chile stands out for its
use of legal protections to anchor the authoritarian regime’s economic policies. While, as
we noted above, the legislative process under the Pinochet regime lacked features
associated with rule-of-law states, such as checks and balances or access for private
participation, the regime was quite meticulous about grounding its economic policies in
formal law. This practice reflected a long culture of legalism in Chile.143 Although the
junta’s primary motivation for adopting the Constitution of 1980 was settlement of intramilitary conflict,144 the Constitution also accomplished a high priority task of the regime:
securing its economic policies well into the future, even in the event of political change in
Chile. These constitutional protections for economic freedoms appear to have
140
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significantly bolstered confidence in the stability of Chile’s long-term economic
trajectory; economic growth accelerated after the center-left successors to Pinochet as
president committed to the constitution’s protection of the regime’s economic policy. As
we saw, legislation was also central to the creation of a successful foreign investment
regime.
In contrast to the culture of legalism in Chile, the Park regime carried out its
policies in reliance on a pre-existing culture of bureaucratic competence and
administrative informality. Similar to Japan in its developmental phase, bureaucratic fiat
was the central mechanism used to regulate the Korean economy, despite the relatively
developed nature of the formal legal system. Government-orchestrated trade associations
and informal contacts between the economic bureaucrats and the private sector served as
the principal conduits for policy formation, implementation and monitoring, backed up
by the government’s power.
China’s approach to economic institutions is something of a hybrid of the Chilean
and Korean approaches. The complex bureaucratic and political landscape remains the
supreme feature of economic administration. Much regulatory activity is informal, yet
legalism is on the rise. Laws and regulations have proliferated in recent years, and have
become an important, if still unevenly applied, element in the process of economic
governance. Thus, just as a variety of developmental strategies can be effective, our
study suggests that a variety of institutional approaches can effectuate those strategies.
Despite these differences, our country narratives reveal some striking similarities.
First, all three studies feature a political regime with a preference for national economic
development over the accumulation of personal wealth. However deficient Pinochet,
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Park, and Deng may have been along other important dimensions of governance—and
there is a great deal to criticize in terms of human rights and civil liberties—they
remained relatively free of corrupting influences and pursued policies that raised the
standard of living for many of their citizens. In striking contrast to most authoritarian
rulers (and some democratic ones), they did not use political power to pursue personal
wealth, although China’s Princeling phenomenon straddles the line between the use of
family members to facilitate contracting145 and corruption.146
Understanding at a deep level why the political leaders in our study made this
choice is well beyond our ambitions here, but several observations shed light on the
question. One of us has suggested that it is analytically helpful to distinguish between
pecuniary and nonpecuniary private benefits of control in comparative corporate
governance,147 and this taxonomy also appears apt in political governance. Economic
success under authoritarian regimes seems to come about in the rare cases in which an
autocrat seeks Great Man status through developmental transformation, in effect
choosing non-pecuniary over pecuniary private benefits of control. But as illustrated by
the widely varied motivations of Pinochet, Park, and Deng, the preference for status as a
leader over personal wealth accumulation appears highly idiosyncratic and is likely to be
heavily influenced by historical circumstance.148 Pinochet was intellectually attracted to
Milton Friedman’s ideas; but he also saw that radical free market reforms would
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undermine his political enemies and weaken the Chilean social traditions he despised.
Deng Xiaoping was a socialist, but he had a front row seat on the disastrous
consequences of Mao’s collectivist economic policies. He was influenced by the rise of
the Asian Tiger economies, which achieved both domestic prosperity and international
respect through development. Deng reinforced his commitment to economic
development in the early 1990s in part to salvage his legacy after worldwide
condemnation of his regime’s brutal response to the Tiananmen protests.149 Park ChungHee, as noted above, was captivated by Japan’s corporatist path to industrialization. He
saw how a neighboring Asian country could rise from the ashes of war by marshalling a
national will to develop, building on a tradition of bureaucratic competence to forge a
partnership between the state and private entrepreneurial resources.
From this small sample, we might at least conclude that the preference for
nonpecuniary private benefits of political control is not closely linked to political or
economic ideology. As noted, historical circumstances seem important. One common
element in these radically different national histories is that the political leader who
initiated economic transformation emerged when his country was either in the midst of,
or just emerging from, a period of (real or perceived) existential chaos—the rise of
socialism and anarchy under Allende, civil war in Korea, and the Cultural Revolution in
China.150 The transformational success of these political leaders may be due in part to a
national readiness to be led, at least by important elements of the population, in order to
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restore national pride or at least social order, and because of the compelling attraction of
growth to the well being of the population.
Although the commitment of the three leaders to economic development was
highly idiosyncratic, the crucial point is that the ability of their regimes to credibly
commit to growth was not. Stated differently, the preference of the decision maker for
growth was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the country’s developmental
success. Other commentators have suggested otherwise. For example, scholars have
recently argued that constraints on political leaders are not essential to growth. In this
way, autocracies produce growth by improving human and physical capital; institutions
subsequently improve as countries grow richer.151 They write, “In many poor countries,
security [of property rights and constraints on government] comes from policy choices
made by dictators. The economic success of East Asia in the post war era, and of China
most recently, has been a consequence of good-for-growth dictators, not of institutions
constraining them.”152 Similarly, Fareed Zakaria argues that the success of what he calls
“liberal authoritarian regimes” in South Korea, China, Chile and elsewhere are the result
of “shrewd choices for the long term.”153
In critical respects, our theoretical perspective and country studies are not
consistent with this view. What makes an autocracy “good for growth” is not simply the
leader’s preference for growth or his shrewd choices about developmental strategy. The
economically benevolent autocracy is able to assure economic actors that pledges to
pursue growth and to allow economic actors to keep the fruits of their investments will be
honored. Credible commitment is secured by institutions (whether formal or informal),
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not individual preferences. This fundamental conclusion of our study is shared by
scholars who focused, not on twentieth century dictators, but on the kings of medieval
Europe.154
The ruler’s need to credibly commit to growth may help explain the presence of
business groups in each of our case studies. One way to secure credible commitment is
through repeated interactions. We have seen how each of the regimes in our studies
worked with—and indeed, helped create – business groups as partners in the
development project. Long-term interaction between the political regime and the
business groups secured the growth pact, because both parties derived benefits from the
arrangement. The business groups provided the hydraulics for the regime’s growth
strategy. Close connections between state economic planners and key business people
reduced information asymmetries about both policy direction and effects, and the
resulting increase in switching costs reduced the risk of future policy changes that would
threaten investment returns.
These effects were very pronounced in the case of Chile, where the new
international conglomerates were the only groups with access to the regime’s economic
policy making process. Privileged access gave the conglomerates a key role in policy
formation and allowed them to expand aggressively, raising GDP growth in the
process.155 Coordination, communication and enforcement costs for all three regimes
were reduced by the regime’s ability to work with a limited number of business people,
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which, in turn, facilitated accountability – responsibility for performance was clear.
Growth, then, provided profits for business and legitimacy for both the political regime
and the economic elites. Government support helped scale up relational networks and
adapt them to global markets. Business groups thus help governments address the
incomplete contracting problem inherent in economic development.
Consistent with this perspective, Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafey have suggested
that business groups allow the state to orchestrate a “big push” into several sectors
simultaneously.156 Business groups thus merit a more positive, or at least more holistic,
evaluation than they typically receive in the economics literature, where they are
generally viewed solely through the lens of agency costs as a means to organize private
activity, rather than as governmentally supported agents of economic policy.157
The policy debate about institutions for economic growth, as well as scholarly
explanations for economic success, have centered on the required character of those
institutions. Formal institutions (i.e. laws and regulations) are often said to be more
predictable, transparent and open than informal institutions, and thus more conducive to
economic development. The World Bank, drawing intellectual support from a decade of
economics literature, has consistently stressed the importance of a formal legal system to
economic development.158 Particularly in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 199798, the World Bank and other financial institutions promoted changes in corporate,
securities, and bankruptcy laws based on a standard menu of statutory provisions thought
to improve investor and creditor protections and thereby produce positive economic
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outcomes. But China’s dramatic growth under weak formal legal institutions posed a
serious challenge to this conceptual approach to law and development. To resolve the
conflict, a revisionist argument has emerged, attributing China’s dramatic economic
growth to its lack of Western-style formal legal institutions.159 As previously discussed,
Franklin Allen and Jun Qian argue that China has succeeded by avoiding formal law-which in their view is rigid and susceptible to interest group capture--and relying instead
on reputational and other informal devices to support economic activity.160
Our analysis, however, indicates that the formalist’s emphasis on the character of
institutions for economic development is misplaced, as is the informalist’s ignoring of the
state’s central role in facilitating what are in fact only quasi-informal arrangements.
High growth autocracies have used a range of formal and informal mechanisms to
support their developmental policies with the state playing a central role across the entire
continuum. As scholars dating back to Max Weber have recognized, nondemocratic
regimes can make their decisions “calculable” by effectively bounding the range of
possible outcomes, even in the absence of formal constraints on the state.161 It is the
function, not the character, of an institution that matters for purposes of economic
development.162 Perhaps the signature lesson to be taken from China’s growth is that,
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given political will to develop and existing endowments, pragmatism and creativity in
devising credible commitment devices will be richly rewarded.163
V. Lessons for Developing Democracies: Creating Credible Commitment
We examined the experiences of three economically successful autocracies with
the goal, not of extolling the performance of authoritarian governments, but to identify
the techniques they used to credibly commit to building the institutions that support
economic growth. The diversity of the three experiences teaches one important lesson.
Just as a country’s development strategy will be in part a path dependent function of its
history, so too will the mechanisms available to an emerging democracy for securing
credible commitments be dependent upon its circumstances. As suggested previously,
this counsels against identifying best practices and in favor of functional efforts to solve a
problem common to developing countries regardless of form; the problem, but not always
the responses, will generalize.164
Shifting focus from the character of institutions for growth to their function
suggests that a range of novel institutional approaches is worthy of consideration by
developing democracies. Such democracies plainly lack the capacity to directly commit
to growth that was available to economically benevolent autocracies. But credible
commitment can be secured in a variety of ways that may not require the governmental
power available to an autocracy, including repeated dealings, changing the party with
decision-making authority, and enforceable contracts.165 Seeking to provide several
illustrations rather than a catalogue, we discuss a few concrete examples of how
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pragmatically creative institutions may sustain credible commitment to development even
in a weak democracy. And here our own biases emerge quite clearly. We prefer seeing
an existing democracy develop to the hope that development will lead an autocracy to
democratize.
As we noted above, part of the problem facing countries seeking to make the
transition from relational to arm’s length commerce is that credible formal enforcement
institutions are difficult to establish and impossible to establish quickly, while informal
government support for relational enforcement is difficult to make credible in the face of
elite resistance – a characteristic of developing democracies. But what one country
cannot do for itself, a group of countries may accomplish collectively. As our earlier
discussion of Russian corporate law reform showed, it is relatively easy to adopt
commercially supportive substantive law but absolutely difficult to establish effective
formal enforcement. At least part of the difficulty is that in a dispute involving a local
elite, the Olson problem presents a significant barrier. Even though the costs to the
economy of favoring the local interest are significant, the elite’s influence nonetheless
may subvert the enforcement process.166 The intuition is that when it is not possible for
a state to credibly commit itself to take hard decisions, the enforcement mechanism can
be credibly outsourced through multinational effort. In precisely those circumstances
when an individual state would flinch at taking enforcement action, its counterparties
could be counted upon to act.
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For example, one way of pre-committing the state to more evenhanded
enforcement by reducing the influence of the local elite is through the establishment of a
regional commercial court.167 Such a court, created for example by a group of countries
in East Asia or South America in connection with regional trade pacts, could be
composed of judges drawn from the region with expertise in business and finance. Firms
could contractually bind themselves to resolve disputes with trading partners or investors
in the regional court. While a country would still have to enforce a judgment of the
regional court, the failure to do so would invite retaliation by the country’s largest trading
partners, thereby allowing even an emerging democracy to make a credible precommitment to the unbiased enforcement of arm’s length contracting associated with the
next step in economic development.168
Other imaginative examples of achieving credible commitment to politically
unbiased enforcement of investor protections in the absence of highly functional statesupplied legal procedures can be found in Taiwan and South Korea, both very successful
economies with authoritarian political histories. In Taiwan, the Securities Futures
Institute (SFI) is an ingenious mechanism for overcoming collective action problems and
political uncertainties in shareholder litigation.169 The SFI is a nonprofit organization
established by, but separate from, the Taiwanese securities regulatory authority. The
organization purchases one trading unit of shares of each publicly listed company in
Taiwan, giving it standing to bring suit as a shareholder. By delegating enforcement to

167

Jens Dammann and Henry Hansmann note that regional courts merit more extensive consideration as a
response to weak national judicial systems. See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 38, at 56.
168
Avinesh Dixit, Governance Activities and Economic Activity, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (2009), discusses
the mechanisms of multilateral enforcement.
169
See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence
from East Asia, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 169 (2004).

74

an organization politically one step removed from the government, the state makes
political protection of elites more difficult and thereby provides support to the
establishment of effective capital markets, an area where there is considerable empirical
evidence that informal enforcement is not a substitute for formal enforcement.170 In
Korea, a private NGO without links to the government has successfully performed a
similar function.171 Developing creative partnerships between the government and
nonprofit organizations to encourage better enforcement of law seems a good deal more
feasible than transplanting procedural mechanisms such as class action litigation from
other countries onto a judicial process that is still far from mature.
Finally, the potential of creative contracts as commitment devices is underscored
by three examples from South America: two from Chile and one from Brazil. The first
Chilean example is the state’s contractual promises to foreign investors to maintain
consistent tax policies and arbitrate disputes in a neutral forum. The second is the 1980
Constitution’s explicit enumeration of economic freedoms, protected by high barriers to
amendment. The Brazilian example involves a private effort to improve by contract the
effectiveness of the capital market and, correspondingly, to lower the cost of equity
capital by providing greater shareholder protection. A barrier to capital market reform in
Brazil was that it threatened the existing elite who controlled much of the economy
through high voting shares, and who had the power to block legislative reform. The
solution was the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange’s initiative to give private companies the
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option to list on a new stock exchange segment that provides much greater shareholder
protection, including a requirement of one-vote per share, without altering the rules
governing companies controlled by the existing elite and therefore without directly
threatening their position.172
Our goal here is not to exhaustively survey the variety of ways in which an
emerging democracy can credibly commit to growth-inducing enforcement through
formal or informal means. Rather, it is to highlight the potential for multilateral
government enforcement and informal private initiative to provide a level of credible
commitment necessary to support growth. Clarifying the task – to develop techniques
that allow developing democracies to credibly ties their hands – will allow scholars and
policy analysts to generate a range of “Commitment Apps” that will facilitate economic
development by developing democracies.
VI. Economic Development and Political Liberalization
Up to this point, our focus has been on the potential linkage between political
regime type and the creation of institutions conducive to economic development. We
conclude with some thoughts on a corollary question of major contemporary significance,
particularly in relation to China: Does economic development lead to political
liberalization?173
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While we earlier saw that the empirical evidence does not support the proposition
that democracy leads to economic growth,174 an influential literature argues that
economic growth leads inexorably to political liberalization. The developmental
experiences of Chile and East Asian countries are widely cited in support of this view. 175
Francis Fukuyama, for example, claims that
The desire to live in a liberal democracy is not initially nearly as
widespread as the desire for development. In fact, there are many
authoritarian regimes like today’s China and Singapore, or Chile under
General Pinochet that have been able to develop and modernize quite
successfully. However, there is a strong correlation between successful
economic development and the growth of democratic institutions,
something originally noted by the great sociologist Seymour Martin
Lipset.176
Similarly, Fareed Zakaria writes that “the best-consolidated democracies in Latin
America and East Asia—Chile, South Korea, and Taiwan—were for a long while ruled
by military juntas. In East Asia, as in western Europe, liberalizing autocracies laid the
groundwork for stable liberal democracies.”177
The argument for a tight nexus between economic development and political
liberalization is founded on a compelling chain of logic. Though the details vary, the
argument generally proceeds along the following lines: Economic development requires a
rule of law to protect property rights. Development generates a middle class and spawns
complex organizations interposed between the state and the people. An increasingly
comfortable middle class eventually seeks greater freedom of choice in the realms of
politics and civil society, while the formation of new organizations causes power to
than carefully nuanced continuums. Steven Haber, Authoritarian Government, in Oxford Handbook of
Political Economy 693 (Barry Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2006), focuses on an operational
definition of authoritarian governments.
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devolve from the state. In turn, the state becomes increasingly rule bound as it negotiates
with these new, competing sources of authority. Political liberalization follows,
sometimes only unintentionally, as protections expand from property rights to human
rights and freedoms.178
Although internally consistent and compelling, there are problems with this
argument that become apparent when it is examined in light of actual experience.
Consider the common reference to Chile as an illustration of the nexus. Chileans
themselves disagree markedly on the contribution of Pinochet’s economic policies to
political liberalization.179 Some commentators—typically past supporters of the Pinochet
regime--argue that the economic technocrats, understanding the relationship between
economic freedom and political liberty, essentially engineered Chile’s return to
democracy.180 Zakaria echoes a version of this claim in asserting that, despite his
failings, “Pinochet did eventually lead his country to liberal democracy.” 181 A distinct
and more nuanced argument is that the modernizing impact of the spread of market ideas
in Chile provided the main thrust for the country’s major advance in development, which
fostered a new democracy, distinct from the one that existed prior to Pinochet.182 This
debate is instructive, because it highlights an essential fact of Chile’s experience typically
overlooked by proponents of the development-to-democracy theory: Chile had a
democratic form of government—albeit a weak one—for most of the twentieth century,
and returned to democracy following a comparatively brief interruption of military
dictatorship. As such, Chile’s experience is hardly a close fit for countries such as China,
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which – again, putting aside labels -- have never experienced a government that is
responsive and responsible to the people. Moreover, the sequence between development
and the return to democracy in Chile is far from linear. In fact, Chile’s economy enjoyed
its best performance in the 1990s--after Pinochet’s departure. As we noted in our country
sketch, the prospect of a return to democracy may have actually diminished confidence in
Chile’s developmental trajectory, at least until it became apparent that the democratically
elected leaders following Pinochet would retain the economic stance self-consciously
enshrined in the 1980 constitution, which had as its goal constraining the future actions of
someone other than Pinochet.183
If the Chilean case does not clearly support the conventional wisdom about the
causal link between economic growth and democratization, what does it signify? The
most notable feature of the story is Pinochet’s adherence to legal norms to pursue his
economic development agenda. This legalist bent eventually eroded his regime’s grip on
political power. As commentators note,
Soon after crushing the elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973,
the Chilean regime found it necessary to create a stable and predictable set
of legal norms. In so doing the regime sought to provide private market
actors a degree of predictability and hence a more favorable environment
for investment. The legal structure that the Pinochet regime erected
eventually contributed decisively to the regime’s demise: it couldn’t get
out of its commitment to subject its rule to popular referendum or thwart
the institutions it had set up to make the referendum fair, and it lost the
referendum.184
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The Chilean case is thus a significant rule of law story, illustrating the importance
of formal institutional constraints on political power to the eventual emergence or reemergence of democracy. It demonstrates the inherent difficulty political leaders face in
seeking to confine the rule of law to the economic realm. This conclusion sits
comfortably with the conventional wisdom, but recall that Pinochet was adhering to a
climate of legalism and democratic politics that predated his regime by nearly a century.
Again, we see the importance of path dependency and a country’s own history.
Pinochet’s decision to subject his regime to a plebiscite (to be sure, an election he
believed he could not lose), was almost certainly influenced by his country’s unique
history. In short, while the implications of Chile’s experience for the relationship
between development and democracy are worthy of deep study, casual references to
Chile’s experience in support of a direct progression from economic growth to political
liberalization are highly misleading, especially when made in the context of
contemporary China.
Now let us turn now to South Korea—another country often cited by proponents
of the development-to-democracy progression. In broad outline, the country’s recent
historical experience does fit the conventional wisdom quite well. As South Korea
developed economically under authoritarian rule, the population grew increasingly
restive, demanding greater social and political freedoms. An active civil society grew up
quite literally out of street protests against the series of military governments which
followed Park Chung-Hee. In 1987, military strong man Chun Doo-hwan acceded to
protests and allowed his successor to be chosen in a direct presidential election.185 In
1992, three decades after Park seized power, a free election produced the first civilian
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president, Kim Young-sam. Three democratically elected presidents have followed, and
South Korea receives high rankings for political rights and civil liberties.186
This extremely impressive national accomplishment merits the attention it has
received. But this is only a partial narrative of the link between economic development
and political life in South Korea. At least from the perspective of how Korea’s recent
history may be relevant to China, there is more to the story.
As we have seen, the conventional wisdom stresses the emergence of complex
organizations in the process of development as a counter weight to state power. In each
of our country studies, and most dramatically in Korea, we have seen that economic
development generated a particular form of new, complex organization interposed
between the government and the market—the business group, whether privately owned or
state controlled. The political implications of business groups as engines of economic
growth have not been carefully considered in exploring the democratization hypothesis.
In particular, the rise of huge, globally competitive multinational firms embedded in
networks of affiliations, including familial connections, with the Communist Party and
state organs has not been fully analyzed in the debate over China’s potential for political
liberalization. This is where the other side of Korea’s story may be highly relevant.
South Korea’s developmental path has created a decades-long tension between the
economic benefits of chaebol-led growth and the political influence of the business
groups. The tension is perhaps inherent in the chaebol themselves, which are creatures of
the political environment: “the rapid growth of the chaebol is generally considered to be
the result of political decisions by the government – the result of governmental favoritism
186
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through interlocking relations between politicians or government policy-makers and
entrepreneurs.”187 Although the authoritarian military rulers who created these linkages
have been replaced by democratically elected civilians, the business groups forged out of
the growth alliance in the 1960s remain as powerful actors in the Korean political
economy. Many of the chaebol today are enormous organizations with far flung
operations and globally recognized brand names (think of Samsung Electronics or
Hyundai Motors, for example). Consistent with the development-to-democracy
hypothesis, they do indeed possess considerable power vis-à-vis the state. But their
influence is not necessarily conducive to a more transparent and accountable political
process or more robust rule of law. The chaebol have been linked to a long series of
political scandals, and they have staunchly resisted legal reforms that would diminish
their power.188 As Freedom House reports, “Despite the overall health of the South
Korean political system, bribery, influence peddling, and extortion by officials have not
been eradicated from politics, business and everyday life.”189 No government subsequent
to Park’s has succeeded in distancing itself from chaebol influence or reducing the
impact of these groups in the political economy. Rather, they “have all reneged on early
promises of taming the chaebol and have pursued pro-growth strategies relying on the
chaebol as the engines of that growth.”190
Historical experience suggests that key entrepreneurs present at the critical
moment in a country’s national economic transformation often take on larger-than-life
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roles in the realm of political governance as well. This was as true of the nineteenth
century robber barons in the United States as of the Russian oligarchs who emerged in
the 1990s. The accumulation of wealth and influence of economic elites, coupled with
the state’s fear of cutting off the engine of development by reining in their operations, can
significantly complicate the process of political and legal reform. Globalization serves to
magnify this process, as the scope of state influence wanes vis-à-vis businesses that are
highly mobile across national boundaries.191
This perspective may bear on the prospect of political liberalization in China. To
a far greater extent than was ever the case in South Korea, key political and economic
actors are bound up together in a dense network of interlocking relationships. From the
Princeling phenomenon to the promotion standards operating in the system of economic
quasi-federalism, and from pervasive state ownership of large enterprises to portfolio
investment by the country’s sovereign wealth fund, the political regime has thoroughly
embedded itself in the high powered incentive structures that fuel the country’s economic
growth. At least in the realm of globally competitive or potentially competitive firms,
Communist China is indivisible from Corporate China.
A political economy of this sort has few parallels in history.192 To the extent
historical parallels can be conjured up, they do not provide grounds for optimism about
China’s prospects for political liberalization.193 As of this writing, the extensive linkages
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between the Party and the largest firms in the economy, while beneficial for domestic
growth and global expansion, have not had a salutary effect on either corporate
governance nor on Governance with a capital G. To the contrary, corruption and nontransparency have been exported by the overseas operations of state-linked firms.194
Particularly in light of South Korea’s experience with the chaebol, it is fair to ask
whether China’s future political liberalization is imperiled by precisely the mechanisms
that have been devised to develop economically.195
China to date provides a vivid illustration—in contrast to Chile--of the way
economic growth-promoting constraints may strengthen, rather than undermine, the
political survival of the regime.196 Many commentators, economists in particular, simply
equate institutions with “constraints on government,”197 without recognizing that
governments often constrain the exercise of their authority selectively and strategically.
Our study shows that national economic transformation can be achieved with a variety of
institutions whose creation and effectiveness are not uniquely tied to a rule of law and
political accountability as conventionally understood. If this analysis is correct, China’s
rise may similarly challenge the conventional wisdom about the effects of economic
development on the emergence of a liberal political order.
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At the very least, the collective nature of China’s autocracy, with its
institutionalized succession processes, suggests that if political liberalization is to occur
over the medium term, it will be brought about principally through intra-Party reforms
rather than bottom-up expression of aspirations for political freedom. This is likely to
have a profoundly constraining effect on the nature of the transition process and the posttransition economic structures. As we have stressed, political succession raises
credibility problems, as economic actors worry about the new regime’s adoption of
policies that will devalue existing investments and discourage new ones. This is where
Chile’s experience with democratic transition may actually be most instructive for China.
Recall Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution, which contained modest political reforms coupled
with iron-clad protections for the existing economic order. Similarly, the Chinese case
predicts liberalization through gradual formalization of democratic elements within the
Party, coupled with hard-to-change rules relating to the economy.198 Under a system of
intra-Party political reform, Princelings and other entrepreneurs with close ties to the
Party, together with key state-affiliated enterprises, will likely continue to serve as
important commitment devices in market transactions. While the role of the legal system
in protecting economic expectations may continue to grow, it is unlikely to supplant the
preeminent role of the government in informally encouraging contractual performance in
support of development.

198

Note that such a process is consistent with the disavowal of Western-style separation of powers for
China, which the current leadership makes with some regularity. See Nathan, supra note 174 (arguing that
“democracy” carries a very different meaning to Chinese leaders than to Westerners). A Western-style
separation of powers could be viewed by Party leaders as precisely the type of political system at risk of
interest group capture or policy gridlock that would threaten continued development. This is not to argue
that China’s current political system is free from interest group capture, corruption, and many other ills. It
is simply to emphasize the likely role that concern for continued development will play in constraining
political reform in China.

85

